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Page 27 ~ Referral/Consult;
Page 28 ~ Referral/Direct;
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b7C

1 - [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

SAC, New York

11-24-61

Director, FBI

ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KRULAK
IS - R

Department of State by communication 11-21-61 advised that subject, born 3-27-22, Moscow, has applied for a visa to come to the U.S. as an employee of the UN Secretariat.

Bufiles contain no information identifiable with subject.

You should be alert for subject's arrival and handle in accordance with Section 105K, MOI. You are authorized to conduct discreet fisurs of subject upon his arrival in this country, if you consider this desirable. This authority includes fisurs of subject when traveling outside his headquarters city. You should, however, obtain additional Bureau authority if fisurs are to exceed a total of 21 days. (S)(U)

b7D

WFO should exhibit photo of subject to [redacted] when available.

2 - WFO

2-11-03 60267 NLS/Baw/mc

2405

60267 NLS/Baw/mc 1,6

JJT:cgw
(6)

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b7E

[redacted]

MAILED 19
NOV 24 1961
COMM-FBI

~~SECRET~~

NOV 27 1961

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62 NOV 30 1961

4-2 [redacted]

[redacted]eral Bureau of In[redacted]tigation
Records Branch

11-22, 1961

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b7C

- [ ] Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
- [ ] Service Unit - Room 6524
- [ ] Forward to [redacted]
- [✓] Attention
- [✓] Return to [redacted] 6478B
  Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
- [ ] Regular Request (Analytical Search)
- [✓] All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
- [ ] Subversive References Only
- [ ] Nonsubversive References Only
- [ ] Main _____ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
- [ ] Restricted to Locality of _____
- [ ] Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
- [ ] Buildup [ ] Variations

Subject Alekssei Isidrovich Krylak
Birthdate & Place 3-22-22 Russia
Address _____

Localities _____

R# _____ Date _____ Searcher Initials EJ

Prod. _____

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	NR	
	B/dm	
	NR	

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-11-03 BY 60267 AIS/Baw/mc

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] DATE: January 11, 1962 b3 b7E

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: CHANGED
ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK aka
Aleksei I. Krulak
IS-R OKRULAK, ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH b3 b6 b7C b7D b7E

ReBulet to NY, 11/24/61, captioned "ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KRULAK, IS-R", [redacted]

The title of this case is being marked "Changed" to show subject's true name as ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK as contained in records at the UN Secretariat, NYC, according to [redacted] on 1/3/62.

[redacted] advised on 1/3/62, that KULAK is employed as a Consultant, Scientific Committee, on the effects of Atomic Radiation, UN Secretariat, NYC. The source gave subject's residence as the Hamilton Hotel, Manhattan, NY.

[redacted] Hamilton Hotel, 143 West 73rd Street, NYC, advised on 1/4/62, that ALEKSEI KULAK occupied room 1107 at that hotel from 11/30/61, to 1/1/62. Subject checked out of the hotel on the latter date and [redacted] stated he has no information regarding KULAK's current residence.

Investigation is being conducted to determine subject's present residence and discreet surveillances are being initiated regarding his activities.

EX-115

(2- [redacted] (RM)
1- Washington Field (Info) (RM)
1- [redacted] b3 b7E b6 b7C

HEM:csp
(4)

MCT - 25

25 JAN 12 1962

REC- 11

SEARCHED INDEXED SERIALIZED

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-11-03 BY 60267/1S/BawImc

51 JAN 19 1962

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014
By J89J28T90

FD-218 (Rev. 3-23-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

201 East 69th Street
New York 21, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

(U) MOVEMENT OF SOVIET NATIONALS (S)

DATE: 12/11/61

RE: KRULAK, ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH aka, Alexei Kulak

The following information regarding the above-captioned alien was furnished on 12/8/61 by the office of the Immigration and Naturalization Service located at NY, NY.

Date and Place of Birth: 3/27/22, Moscow

Nationality (Citizenship) USSR Passport No. 19251

Type of Visa: G-4 Occupation: NI

Visa Issued at: Moscow Date Visa Issued: 11/28/61

Arrived: 11/29/61 Via SAS 911 At NY Int.

U. S. Address or Destination UN Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation

Admitted Until: D/S

Departed: Via At

Destination:

Permanent Foreign Address: Moscow

Dependents: [redacted]

2-11-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 AIS/Baw/MC-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

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b7E

4- [redacted]
1- Washington Field (INFO)(RM)
1 [redacted]
1- New York (100-62936)

RECORDED
25 DEC 12 1961

b6
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CTW:ptp
(7)

CIA by Form 0-14f
NSA via liaison
Date forw. 12/13/61
By

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

58 DEC 15 1961

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)
DATE 01-15-2015 By: J89J28T90

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WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

Reporting Office	Office of Origin	Date	Investigative Period
NEW YORK	NEW YORK	2/16/62	12/1/61 - 2/9/62

TITLE OF CASE	Report made by	Typed By:
ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK aka Aleksei I. Krulak	HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.	dbw
	CHARACTER OF CASE: INTERNAL SECURITY - R	

~~EXEMPTED~~

REFERENCES

2-19-03
60267 NISBaw/MC-AAC

Bulet to NY 11/24/61.
NYlet to Bureau 1/11/62.

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE

The name ALEXEI KULAK is not being carried in the title of this report inasmuch as there is no indication the subject actually uses this variation in the spelling of his first name. NY will remain alert regarding this name and will include it in the title of future communications if it becomes apparent he is using this spelling of the name.

(U) During the period of this report, the following hotels in Manhattan, NY, frequently used by Soviet nationals, were checked to determine subject's present residence with negative results: (S)

Approved _____ Special Agent In Charge

Copies made:

5 - [redacted] (RM)

2 - [redacted]

Do not write in spaces below

[redacted]

REC 46

11 FEB 20 1962

EX 101

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SEC. CC TO:

REQ. REC'D 3:30

MAR 23 1962

ANS.

BY:

AGENCY State, Cust, Pass (IS-D)
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 2/16/62
HOW FORW. 4/5
BY

SECRET

ty of FBI This report is loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside the agency to which loaned.

5 MAR 5 1962

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1958 O—344750

SECRET

[redacted]

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Hotel Chalfonte
200 West 70th Street

Bellclaire Hotel
250 West 77th Street

Beacon Hotel
2130 Broadway

Berkley Hotel
170 West 74th Street

Greystone Hotel
212 West 91st Street

Lincoln Square Hotel
166 West 75th Street

Hotel Congress
19 West 69th Street

Manhattan Towers
Broadway and 76th Street

Sherman Square Hotel
Broadway and 71st Street

Hotel Sussex
116 West 72nd Street

Walton Hotel
104 West 70th Street

Alamac Hotel
Broadway and 71st Street

Physical surveillances were instituted regarding the subject on the following dates, but he was not observed:

1/11, 12, 15, 22 and 25/62
2/5/62

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[redacted]

Indices of the NYO and the WFO, as checked during December, 1961, contain no information regarding the subject.

INFORMANTS

Identity	Location
NY T-1 [redacted]	[redacted]
NY T-2 [redacted] (S)	

b1
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(5)

Careful consideration has been given to the sources concealed and T symbols were utilized only in those instances where the identities of the sources must be concealed.

LEADS

NEW YORK

At New York, New York

1. Will maintain contact with established sources for any information they can furnish regarding the subject.

2. Will conduct investigation to determine subject's present residence.

3. Will ascertain if subject has opened a checking account at the UN Branch of the Chemical Bank NY Trust Company.

4. Will institute physical surveillances re subject to determine residence and activity.

SECRET

[redacted]

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SECRET

CLASSIFICATION

This report and letterhead memorandum are classified "~~Confidential~~" because they contain results of investigation of a Soviet national, who is employed at the UN Secretariat, which investigation requires State Dept. clearance.

D*
COVER PAGE

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SECRET

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC
DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)
DATE 01-15-2015 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

Copy to:

Report of: HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. Office: New York, New York
Date: 2/16/62

Field Office File No.: [redacted] Bureau File No.: [redacted] b3 b7E

Title: ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Synopsis: Subject arrived in the US on 11/29/61. He resided at the Hotel Hamilton, 143 West 73rd Street, Manhattan, NY from 11/30/61 to 1/1/62. Present residence unknown. He is employed as a Consultant, Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, UN Secretariat, NYC. Subject was head of the Radio Chemical Laboratory of the Nuclear Energy Institute, Moscow Academy of Science, Moscow, USSR and from April, 1958 to November, 1961. On 1/16/62, [redacted] b7D could furnish no information regarding the subject and could not identify a photograph of him.

- P -

DETAILS:

This investigation was predicated upon information from the United States Department of State, which advised by communication dated November 21, 1961, that ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK, born March 27, 1922, at Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), had applied for a visa to enter the United States as an employee of the United Nations Secretariat.

2-19-03 60267/115Bawlmc

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

~~SECRET~~

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[redacted] b3 b7E

SECRET

ARRIVAL IN THE UNITED STATES

Records of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), New York City, as furnished on December 8, 1961, reflected the subject entered the United States on November 29, 1961, at New York International Airport, aboard Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) flight 911. The INS records reflected he was born March 27, 1922, at Moscow, was a citizen of the USSR and had passport number 19251. He had a G-4 visa, issued at Moscow on November 28, 1961. His destination was listed as "United Nations Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiation".

RESIDENCE

NY T-1 advised on January 3, 1962, that ALEKSEI I. KULAK resided at the Hamilton Hotel, 143 West 73rd Street, New York City.

[redacted] Hamilton Hotel, b6 b7C advised on January 4, 1962, that ALEKSEI I. KULAK, a Soviet national, had resided in Room 1107 at the Hamilton Hotel from November 30, 1961 to January 1, 1962. [redacted] said that KULAK checked out of the hotel on the latter date and he could furnish no further information regarding him.

Investigation to date has not determined subject's present residence.

EMPLOYMENT

NY T-1 advised on January 3, 1962, that ALEKSEI I. KULAK was employed as a Consultant, Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, United Nations Secretariat, New York City. Informant advised that subject has short term contract scheduled to expire March 31, 1962. Informant said there was no United Nations employee with the surname KRULAK.

NY T-2 [redacted] b1 b3

(S) [redacted]

SECRET

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SECRET

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NY T-2

(S)

NY T-2

FORMER EMPLOYMENTS

(S)

NY T-2

(S)

(S)

(S)

SECRET

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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MISCELLANEOUS

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On January 16, 1962, a photograph of the subject was shown to [redacted] by SA [redacted] could not identify the photograph of the subject and could furnish no information regarding him.

DESCRIPTION

The following descriptive information was obtained from informants and sources previously set out in this report:

Name	ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK aka Aleksei I. Krulak
Race	White
Sex	Male
Height	5' 7"
Weight	165 - 170 pounds
Hair	Dark, receding hairline
Eyes	Grey
Age	39
Date of Birth	March 27, 1922, Moscow, USSR
Nationality	Soviet
Date of Arrived in the United States	November 29, 1961, at New York International Airport

~~SECRET~~

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

Education	Mendeleev Institute of Chemical Technology, where he studied radioactive elements, chemistry, and technology and was made a Candidate of Science in 1952 In 1957, he received his Doctors Degree in Chemistry from Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute
Passport	USSR number 19251

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-15-2015 By: J89J28T9D

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

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New York, New York
February 16, 1962

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Title Aleksei Isidorovich Kulak

Character Internal Security - R

Reference Report of Special Agent Harry E. Morris, Jr., dated and captioned as above, at NewYork.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~ ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-01

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] DATE: 3/21/62

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: ALEKSEI I. KULAK aka
IS - R

Rerep SA HARRY E. MORRIS, JR., dated 2/16/62, at New York.

As reflected in rerep, [redacted] advised on 1/3/62, that subject, a Soviet national, was employed as a Consultant on the Scientific Committee on Effects of Atomic Radiation, UN Secretariat, NYC, and that he had a short term contract which was to expire 3/31/62.

[redacted] advised on 2/13/62, that ALEKSEI I. KULAK had made tentative travel arrangements to leave the US in March, 1962. Investigation to date has not determined any definite action on the part of KULAK to make travel arrangements.

NY will submit a report on KULAK when it has been determined whether he will leave the US upon expiration of his current UN contract.

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ST-102

2 - [redacted] (RM)
1 - [redacted]

HEM:jak
(3)

[redacted]

AR 22 1962

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MAR 28 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-24-03 BY 60267/MLSK

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] DATE: 4/13/62

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: ALEKSEI I. KULAK aka
IS-R

ReNYlet to the Bureau, 3/21/62.

On 4/2/62, [redacted] Hotel Excelsior, 45 West 81st St., NYC, (protect), advised SA [redacted] that the captioned individual under the name A. I. KULAK, resides in room 302 at the above hotel. [redacted] stated that KULAK registered at the above hotel on 1/1/62, and pays his rent by the month.

[redacted] stated that he has no information that KULAK is contemplating leaving the hotel.

As pointed out in relet, subject has a short-term contract with the UN which was to expire 3/30/62. To date, no information has been received from Bureau sources at the UN that KULAK's employment has been terminated and that he intends to leave the US.

Bureau authority is requested for additional surveillance coverage on the subject on the basis of the above information. NY will submit a report in this matter.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-24-03 BY 60267015/Baw/mc

2- [redacted]
1- [redacted]

REC- 16 [redacted]

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(3)

5 APR 17 1962

Lab State (urgent) 4-25-62 [redacted]

ST-104

Lab 4-27-62 [redacted]

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014 By J89J28T90

FD-263 (Rev. 5-1-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEW YORK	NEW YORK	4/13/62	2/19/62 - 4/4/62

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
CHANGED ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK aka A. I. Kulak, Alyosha Kulak	HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.	vm

CHARACTER OF CASE

IS - R

El 6

The title of this case is being marked "changed" in order to include the name A. I. KULAK, under which the subject is registered at the Excelsior Hotel, NYC, and to include the name ALYOSHA KULAK as recorded at Brookhaven National Laboratory, LI, NY, as set out in the details of this report.

REFERENCES

Report of SA HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. dated 2/16/62 at NY.
NYlet to the Bureau dated 3/21/62.
NYlet to the Bureau dated 4/13/62.

5-6-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60226 AIS/Baw/mc - AAG - P -
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

APPROVED [redacted] SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

5 - Bureau [redacted] (RM)
2 - New York [redacted]
SEC.C

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

[redacted]

MCI - 16

13 APR 16 1962

REC-33

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DISSEMINATION RECORD OF ATTACHED REPORT

AGENCY	State	CIA	AEC	AMD-ISO
REQUEST RECD.				
DATE FWD.	4-25-62	4-23-62		
HOW FWD.	letter	R/S		
BY	[redacted]	[redacted]		

NOTATIONS

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SECRET

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 16-76324-1

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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ADMINISTRATIVE

The identity of the Special Agent of the FBI who observed subject on 2/27/62 can be located in [redacted]

(U) (S) Analysis of Visits By the Subject to the Soviet Delegation to the UN, 680 Park Avenue, NYC, During January and February, 1962 (S)

(U) During January, 1962, the subject was observed to exit the Soviet Delegation on 1/20/62, at 2:21 p.m. He was not observed to enter or exit the Soviet Delegation at any other time during this month. (S)

(U) During February, 1962, the subject was not observed to enter or exit the Soviet Delegation at any time. (S)

(U) In view of the above facts, it is not possible to give an evaluation regarding subject's time at the Soviet Delegation during the first two months of 1962 (S)

(U) By letter dated 4/13/62, NY requested Bureau authority for additional surveillance coverage on the subject. (S)

(U) To date investigation reflects subject has not opened a checking account at the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company, UN Branch. (S)

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INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	File Number Where Located
NY T-1 [redacted] (by request)	Instant report page 2 Information furnished to SA [redacted] on 4/2/62

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b7E

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

INFORMANTS CONT'D

Identity of Source	File Number Where Located
NY T-2 [redacted] PSI - R	Instant report page 2 Information furnished to SA [redacted] on 3/23/62
NY T-3 [redacted]	[redacted]
NY T-4 [redacted] PSI	

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed and T symbols were utilized in this report only in those instances where it was necessary to conceal the identities of the sources.

LEADS

NEW YORK

At New York, New York

(U) 1. Will await Bureau authority to conduct additional surveillances on the subject as requested by relet dated 4/13/62. (S)

(U) 2. Will maintain contact with established sources for any information they can furnish regarding the subject. (S)

(U) 3. Will continue to check to determine if subject has opened a checking account at the UN Branch of the Chemical Bank New York Trust Company. (S)

(U) 4. Will be alert to determine if subject leaves the US, it being noted that a short term contract with the UN was to have expired 3/31/62. (S)

COVER PAGE

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[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

LEADS CONT'D

5. Will be alert to determine if subject visits the Brookhaven National Laboratory and report same to the Bureau.

CLASSIFICATION

(U) This report and letterhead memorandum are classified "~~Confidential~~" because they contain the results of an investigation of a Soviet national who is employed at the UN Secretariat, which investigation requires State Department clearance. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014 By: J89J28T90

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York

April 13, 1962

b3
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Title Aleksei Isidorovich Kulak

Character Internal Security - R

Reference is made to the report of Special Agent Harry E. Morris, Jr., dated and captioned as above at New York.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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DATE 11-19-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM encl. detached from airtel of 5-15-62

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TO: SAC, NEW YORK

DATE: 5/14/62

FROM: SA

SUBJECT: UNSUB; Soviet Agent,
Furnishing Aerial Photography
Maps, Contacted By
ESP - R

0 1a 1a

Source

Date of Contact 5/7/62

Contacted By SA

Characterized An individual who has furnished reliable information in the past

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Bureau authority is not necessary prior to incorporating information furnished by into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau when such information is suitably paraphrased in such a manner that the identity of the source is not jeopardized. In the event that certain specific information is of such a nature that it should not be disseminated, the decision not to disseminate the information should be called to the attention of the Bureau on a UACB basis.

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COPIES CONTINUED

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EFG:htc
(38)

CLASSIFIED BY 60267/UC/BaubMC-APG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,2,6
5-6-03

~~SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED
102 MAY 17 1962

21 MAY 21 1962

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[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

COPIES CONTINUED

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1 - [redacted]
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1 - [redacted]
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1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
(U)

1 - [redacted] (S)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
(ALEKSEI I. KULAK)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted] (S)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
(Soviet Nationals Employed on Staff of UN Secretariat)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
(Visit of American National Exhibition Committee, Moscow, 1959)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
(Tracing of American Money Used by Soviets in Espionage) (S)

~~SECRET~~

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

(U) A classification of ~~Confidential~~ will be adequate for material furnished by [redacted] particularly when the information relates to Soviet nationals and it can be paraphrased. Some (S) information furnished by this source, due to its very nature, would necessitate a higher classification inasmuch as the disclosure of such information to any unauthorized persons could have a serious effect upon international relations and on the national defense. b7D

It is suggested that information set forth in communications suitable for dissemination be set forth in a manner similar to or as follows:

> "T symbol in early 1962 advised that" followed by a succinct statement reflecting what informant furnished about a given individual.

This should not include too much detail which might tend to disclose informant as our source.

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b3 b7E

(U) Soviet UN Secretariat Personnel (S)

Informant advised that all of the Soviet employees of the UN Secretariat are required to turn in to the Soviets all of their pay in excess of the amount that their respective or relative ranks in the Soviet Government would call for. For instance, informant advised that a UN employee receiving $1,000 a month, who would have an equivalent rank of a First Secretary in the Soviet Delegation to the UN, would be required to turn in to the Soviets all of the money in excess of what a First Secretary's rank would pay. Informant advised that this money, which is turned over, most probably is put into some type of "pool" and sent back to the Soviet Union. (U) (S)

Additional Photographs Shown to Informant

The following named individuals photographs were shown to the informant with negative results. It is noted that these individuals have been issued visas for entry into the US:

(U) [redacted] (S) b6 b7C b7D

(U) A photograph of [redacted] Soviet Mission to the UN, was displayed to the informant and he identified him as a KGB agent who will come to the US [redacted] Informant said that [redacted] (S)

A photograph of ALEKSEI I. KULAK, a member of the UN Secretariat, was shown to the informant and he advised that he has no intelligence connections. He described KULAK as a graduate of the Academy of Science.

b3
b7E

~~SECRET~~

(U) Informant was shown photographs of [redacted] and [redacted] He described all individuals as members of the KGB who had formerly been in the US. He advised that [redacted] Informant advised that [redacted] at the present time [redacted] He stated that [redacted] Informant has observed both [redacted] and [redacted] (S)

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b7D

~~SECRET~~

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On 5/7/62, informant advised that b6 b7C b7D
(U) apparently has numerous contacts, some of which may not be considered as agents, who are in a position to give him maps of the US. Informant stated that

(S)

In this connection, informant advised that

(U)

(S)

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014 By J89J28T9D

FBI

~~SECRET~~ 5/25/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] b3 b7D b7E

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

[redacted] b6 b7C

ReNYairtel to the Bureau, 5/24/62.

(U) [redacted] was shown photographs, with names, of the following Soviets employed at the UN Secretariat, NYC. He could furnish no information regarding any connection of these individuals with the KGB or the GRU: (S)

[redacted] b6 b7C b7D

(U) [redacted] (S)

4-29-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60226 AUS/Baw/mc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

REC-

3 - [redacted] (RM)
1 - [redacted] (Inv.)

[redacted] b3 b7D b7E

HEM:dmg
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

20 MAY 26 1962

[redacted]

C C - WICK

ESP. SEC.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

53 JUN 4 1962

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ ~~SECRET~~
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b7D
b6
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[redacted]

(U) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~ (Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

informant described this individual as "clean"

(U)

- informant described this individual as "clean"

Approved: _____ Sent ~~SECRET~~ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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b7C
b7D


FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~ (Type plain text or code)

Via _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

~~SECRET~~



(U) (S)

(U) Informant has now been shown photographs of all Soviet nationals currently employed at the UN Secretariat in NYC. As a result he has identified 31 of these individuals as members either of the KGB or the GRU. (S)

This matter is being given close attention and the Bureau will be kept advised of developments.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] DATE: 5/24/62

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: ALEKSEI I. KULAK
IS-R
ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK

Re NY airtels to the Bureau, 5/23/62 and 5/24/62, captioned [redacted]

On the basis of information set out in re airtels the [redacted] classification case on captioned individual is being closed.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-6-03 BY 60762115 Baw/mc

ST-104

2- [redacted] (RM)
1- [redacted]

REC- 27 [redacted]

HEM:eoc
(3)

5 MAY 28 1962

50 JUN 5 1962

[redacted]
ESP. SEC.

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b6
b7C

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - [redacted]

The Attorney General

May 31, 1962

Director, FBI

b3
b7E
b6
b7C

SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

A sensitive confidential source who has a background in Soviet intelligence but with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of information furnished has supplied the data set forth herein. Due to the sensitive nature of our source, it is requested this information be closely held.

[redacted]

ORIGINAL FILED IN

b6
b7C
b7D

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

6-9-03 CLASSIFIED BY 60324/AUS/Baulmc DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

(U) Source stated there is a special KGB (Committee for State Security) school located approximately twenty-five kilometers east of Moscow on the road to Gorki. Lectures given at this school are for indoctrination and background and consist of up-to-date information regarding various types of atomic weapons. (S)

(U) Source further advised that he learned from a KGB representative that a number of sources were developed by the KGB among American employees at the United States Embassy in Moscow in 1961. One of the American employees helped KGB agents open the Ambassador's safe in the Embassy and KGB agents photographed documents that were in the safe. (S)

[redacted]

b3
b7E

NOT RECORDED
140 JUN 4 1962

(U) Source also volunteered that the Soviets have obtained plans for a so-called "Lightning" computer being developed in California and which is capable of making ten million calculations per second. He said the Soviets have also obtained complete plans for two computers which were developed at the University of Illinois. He named these computers as the "Illiack" and the "Silliack" and said they are capable of three million calculations per second. He has no information as to how the Soviets obtained these plans. (S)

DUPLICATE YELLOW

100-354039 (1) - [redacted]

b3
b7E

60 JUN 4 1962

JJP:cgw (10)

~~SECRET~~

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

~~Top Secret~~

~~SECRET~~

The Attorney General

(U) [redacted] b7D

1 - Deputy Attorney General

Cover memo Branigan to Sullivan 5-29-62 JJT:cgw re [redacted]

NOTE: ~~Top Secret~~ to protect our source, [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

~~Top Secret~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan WCS 5/31

DATE: 5-23-62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

SUBJECT: ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

b6
b7C

b7D

ACTION:

It is recommended this memo be routed through Records Section and the Code Room for indexing purposes. Also recommended case file on subject be retained on indefinite basis in Room 649 Riddell Building to be immediately available for reference purposes.

b6
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JJT:cgw
(7) 1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Records Section
1 - Code Room
1 - [redacted] b6 b7C

MCT - 5

25 MAY 31 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE
DATE 5-6-03 BY 60324 AUS/Baw/mc

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b7C

60 JUN 8 1962

0-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 6/1/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] b3 b7D b7E

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

[redacted] b6 b7C

Enclosed for the Bureau are 56 copies of dissemination memoranda containing information furnished [redacted] to ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SA VINCENT J. CAHILL and SA HARRY E. MORRIS, JR., on 5/23/62. These memoranda are for appropriate Bureau files. b7D

Enclosed for WFO are two copies of the above dissemination memoranda. These copies are for the appropriate WFO files.

Additional memoranda concerning the above interview will be furnished the Bureau in the near future.

b3 b7D b7E

3 - [redacted] (Encls. 56) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - [redacted] (INV.)

ENCLOSURE

TJMcK:vc
(5)

REC- 30

[redacted]

50 JUN 15 1962

68 JUN 2 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-6-03 BY 60267018/baw/mc

b6 b7C

Approved: [redacted] Sent [redacted] M Per [redacted]
Special Agent in Charge

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014 By: J89J28T90

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

TO: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] DATE: 5/31/62

FROM: SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

Source [redacted]
Date contacted 5/23/62
Contacted by ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SA VINCENT J. CAHILL and SA HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

~~5-6-03~~
CLASSIFIED BY ~~60267 DK/STC auto MC-AAG~~
DECLASSIFY ON: ~~25X 1,6~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

(U)

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted] (SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES; ILLEGAL SUPPORT SECTION)

1 - [redacted] (SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES)

1 - [redacted] (SOVIET POSSESSION OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS)

1 - [redacted] (SOVIET POSSESSION OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS)

1 - [redacted] (SOVIET BLOC ESPIONAGE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS)

1 - [redacted] (SOVIET BLOC ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS)

1 - [redacted] (UN PERSONNEL - USSR)

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

(S)

TJM:dmg
(18)

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

b7D

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

(U) Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be delicate and will necessitate a classification above "~~Confidential~~" since a disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of "~~Confidential~~" will be adequate if the information relates to [Soviet nationals] (S) and can be adequately paraphrased.

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least ~~"Secret"~~.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- in the middle of 1962 advised...". The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) [Organization of the KGB
Residency in New York City] (S)

(U) Informant advised that the KGB residency in NYC is divided into three divisions which are as follows: (S)

(U) 1. Political Division - headed by the Press Attache of the Soviet Mission. Informant stated he could not identify this individual by name, but feels he would be able to identify a photograph of him. The NYO will subsequently furnish a photograph for informant's observation. (S)

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(U) 2. Scientific, Technical and Economic Section - headed by [redacted] (S)

(U) 3. Security Section - headed by [redacted] (S)

(U) KGB Physical Lay-out - 680 Park Avenue, New York City (S)

(U) The informant stated that each section of the KGB has its own secret room located on the fourth floor of the building at 680 Park Ave., NYC. In addition, there is also on the fourth floor a room designated solely for radio and codes and the only entrance to this room is through the office of the section chief. Informant stated that in addition to the section chief, the only other Soviets allowed in the code and radio room are the two code men and one radio operator. The informant stated that he had not been in this room and, in fact, is not allowed to enter it. The informant stated that while he does not know the identities of the code men and the radio operator by name, he could readily identify them from photographs if same were exhibited to him. (S)

(U) Informant further advised that there is also located on the fourth floor of the same building a separate radio room, which informant stated is used for monitoring FBI radio transmissions. He stated that the Soviets use up-to-date American equipment for monitoring and said that FBI transmissions are put on tape and are then played back. According to the informant, this procedure assists the personnel in breaking the FBI code and ascertaining the subject of the FBI's interest at any given time. The informant noted that the Soviets have only one recording machine for this purpose. Informant stated that the Soviet monitoring of FBI transmissions has resulted in their being able to readily identify the FBI code assigned to the Soviets. (S)

b7D

(U) Informant's Observations Concerning GRU Organization Residency in New York City (S)

(U) Informant stated that while he could not make a definite statement as to the military (GRU) organization in the NY residency, he felt from observation that the GRU probably has the same kind of divisional setup utilized by the KGB at present, together with their own secret rooms, etc., as outlined above. (S)

Allotment of Agents In the New York Residency

(U) In general terms, the informant stated there were approximately ten KGB agents presently assigned to the Scientific Section of the NY residency. There are approximately 17 KGB members presently assigned to the Political Section of the KGB NY residency. Informant advised that there are approximately three members currently assigned to the Security Section of the same KGB residency. He stated that this would approximate a total of 30 KGB members assigned to the NY residency at the present time. Informant estimated that there would be approximately 24 or 25 military (GRU) members assigned to the various sections of the GRU residency in NY. The above constitute a total of 54 or 55 members of the KGB and GRU presently assigned to the NY residency. (S)

(U) Incidental to the above, the informant stated that he estimates there are approximately 25 KGB members currently assigned to the Washington, D.C., residency. (S)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014 By: J89J28T90

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] DATE: 5/31/62

FROM: SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

Source [redacted]
Date contacted 5/23/62
Contacted by ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SA VINCENT J. CAHILL and SA HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UNS/Bawhmc-AAG~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6~~
5-6-03

(U) [redacted] (S)

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TJM:dmg
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SECRET

ENCLOSURE [redacted]

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1 - New York (100-92701)
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1 - (SOVIET NATIONALS EMPLOYED AT UN)
1 - Bureau (61-5381) (AMTORG)
1 - Bureau (100-183386) (TASS NEWS AGENCY)
1 - Bureau (62-77787-329) (UN PERSONNEL - BYELORUSSIAN - UKRAINIAN)
1 - Bureau (62-77787-240) (UN PERSONNEL - USSR)
1 -

(S)

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[redacted]

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be delicate and will necessitate a classification above ~~"Confidential"~~ since a disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of ~~"Confidential"~~ will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased. (S)

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least ~~"Secret"~~.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- in the middle of 1962 advised..." The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) Soviet Intelligence Agents at the UN Secretariat (S)

The informant identified the following Soviets as either KGB or GRU intelligence agents employed at the UN Secretariat, NYC. Identification of these individuals was made by name and photograph. Informant's comments are set forth below concerning each of the individuals listed: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)


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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Intelligence Agents At Ukrainian Mission to the UN (S)

Informant identified the following individuals solely on the basis of name. He did not observe a photograph of these individuals and comments concerning these individuals are attributable to informant:

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

b6
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b7D

(U) Intelligence Agents at Amtorg Trading Corporation (ATC), New York City (S)

(U) Informant identified the following individuals as agents of the KGB at ATC. He identified them solely on the basis of name and did not observe photographs of them: (S)

(U) [redacted] KGB, no section known.
KGB, no section known.
KGB, no section known. (S)

(U) Intelligence Agents at Intourist (S)

(U) Informant advised that the representative of Intourist in the US is an agent of the KGB. He advised that he does not know the name of this individual, but feels that he can identify his photograph if it is shown to him. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) KGB Agents At Soviet UN Mission (S)


(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Soviet Correspondents in US Identified as Intelligence Agents (S)

(U) Informant identified the following on the basis of name only without observing photographs. Their affiliation with KGB or GRU set forth: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
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FD-36 (Rev. 12-12-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014 By: J89J28T90

FBI

Date: 5/29/62

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

b3
b7E

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

b7D

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS-R

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten copies of dissemination memoranda containing information furnished by [redacted] to ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT and SA FORREST S. PUTMAN on 5/22/62. These memoranda are for the appropriate Bureau files.

b7D

Enclosed for Washington Field are two copies of the attached memorandum for pertinent Washington Field files.

(U) On 5/22/62, informant mentioned briefly information concerning [redacted] Inasmuch as the information furnished on [redacted] was elaborated upon in the interview conducted on 5/22/62, the initial information will be incorporated in subsequent dissemination memoranda under the latter date.

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This concludes dissemination of information furnished by the informant on 5/22/62.

3-[redacted] (Encls. 10) (RM)
1-Washington Field (Encls. 2) (RM)
1-[redacted] (INV)

5-6-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267015/Baudhuin-MC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

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TJM:car
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[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC- 30

MAY 30 1962

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-19-2014 By J89J28T90

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

~~SECRET~~

TO SAC, NEW YORK ( ) DATE: 5/29/62

FROM SA THOMAS J. MC KEON (#342)

SUBJECT [redacted]
IS-R

Source [redacted]

Date of Contact 5/22/62

Contacted by ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT
and SA FORREST S. PUTMAN

Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so that dissemination is prohibited, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

(U) Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above ~~confidential~~ since disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon inter~~national~~ relations and the national defense. In all other instances a classification of ~~confidential~~ will be adequate if the information relates to [Soviet nationals] (S) and can be adequately paraphrased.

1- [redacted] 5-6-03

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 AIS Baut MC-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

COPIES CONTINUED

1 [redacted] (INV)

TJM:car
(22)

(U) 1- [redacted] (S)
1 [redacted]
(Soviet Possession of FBI Communications) (S)
(U) 1- [redacted]

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE [redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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~~SECRET~~

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COPIES CONTINUED

1 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

1-NY (100-60713)

1 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

(U)

1 [redacted]

1-Washington Field (66-2479)
(Soviet-Bloc Espionage
and Counterintelligence
Matters)

1 [redacted]
(Current Soviet Espionage
and Subversive Activities)

1-Bureau (61-5381)
(Amtorg Trading Corporation)

1-Bureau (100-183386)
(Tass News Agency)

1 [redacted]
(Russian Funds)

1 [redacted]
(Soviet Intelligence Services)

1 [redacted]

1 [redacted]
(Soviet Espionage Activities,
Illegal Support Section)

(S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b7D

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least "~~Secret~~".

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"New York symbol in the middle of 1962 advised .....". The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

MISCELLANEOUS

(U) KGB and GRU Operations in NYC and Washington, D.C. (S)

(U) Informant would not furnish any specific details concerning his knowledge of KGB or GRU operations. However, he advised that he would be able to identify 500 intelligence agents in the US and abroad, including agents in Mexico, Canada, London, Paris, and Germany. In addition, the informant advised that there are approximately 54 KGB and GRU agents presently operating in the NYC area, and approximately 25 KGB and GRU agents operating in the Washington, D.C. area. Informant also advised that he estimated the KGB presently is handling 40 to 45 agents in the NYC area and approximately 20 agents in the Washington, D.C. area. (S)

(U) Informant also advised that the GRU and KGB, at the Soviet Mission to the UN in NYC, have separate Secret rooms. He also advised that only [redacted] whom he identified as [redacted] has access to the code room, the only exception to this being the code clerks (S) verified by [redacted]. b6 b7C b7D

(U) Informant further advised that every Saturday KGB agents assigned to the UN Secretariat and Soviet correspondents must report to the Soviet Mission and report to the "boss" concerning their activities during the past week. KGB personnel at ATC must report to the Mission (S)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted] b7D

(U) every Friday for the same reason. Informant advised that KGB agents working out of the Soviet Mission are readily available to the KGB "boss" for interview and consultation concerning their activities and work. (S)

(U) Informant advised that it is the general rule that meetings between Soviet principals and their agents are prohibited in Manhattan with the exception of the Greenwich Village area. (S)

Monitoring of FBI Radio Transmissions

(U) Informant advised that both the KGB and GRU are monitoring FBI radio transmissions and the KGB is presently utilizing certain equipment in their automobiles which can detect and monitor FBI radio transmissions which are out of the radius of Soviet Mission in NYC. (S) (verified by [redacted]. (S) b7D

(U) Methods of Contacting Agents of Soviets (S)

(U) Informant advised that Soviet agents contact their agents through the use of personal contacts and drops and by the use of undeveloped film placed in the drops (S) (verified by [redacted]

(U) Soviets' Interest in Calculating Machine (S)

(U) [redacted] stated that the US Government is presently developing in California a high speed calculating machine which can make 10,000 computations per second. Informant stated that even though this machine is only in the developing stage, the Soviets have the plans and he indicated that he knew how they obtained this data. (S)

(U) Soviets' Interest in Amtorg Trading Corporation (S)

(U) The informant advised that the Soviets are buying special military techniques through ATC. (S)

~~SECRET~~

b7D

(U) Soviets' Monthly Budget (S)

[redacted] estimated that the KGB spends approximately (U) $150,000 per month for intelligence information including technical equipment. Informant stated that the KGB has an unlimited budget. (S)

(U) Sections Within the KGB (S)

[redacted] advised that the KGB is divided into three sections:

(U)
1. Political
2. Scientific and Technical
3. Security

(S)

(U) Data Regarding Soviet Illegal Agents (S)

[redacted] stated that he believes there are presently two illegal agents in NY: one operating in Brooklyn, the other (U) in a suburb. [redacted] and he indicated that he could furnish information concerning the additional two illegal operations. (S)

Informant advised that [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

Informant further advised that he believes that some (U) of the illegal residencies would be similar to the Gordon Lonsdale case in that they would receive and transmit their messages to the Soviet Union directly by radio. (S)

~~SECRET~~

(U) Information Regarding [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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b7E

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-24-2014 By: J89J28T90

FBI

~~SECRET~~ Date 5/29/62

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] b3 b7D b7E

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies of memoranda containing information furnished by [redacted] b7D to ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT and SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR., on 5/23/62. These are for proper Bureau files.

5-6-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/Bauhmc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~ (U)

Put Cover sht (S)

[redacted] b3 b7E

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE _____ BY _____

Encls. 1 on main file

3 [redacted] (Encls. 5) (RM)

1 [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E

TJMcK:vc
(4)

ENCLOSURE

REC- 30

12 MAY 30 1962

EX-109

50 JUN 15 1962

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-24-2014 By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] DATE: 5/29/62

FROM : SA [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

Source [redacted] b7D

Date Contacted 5/23/62

Contacted by ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterization An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished

5-6-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60226 NSBaw/mc - AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination b7D outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. When certain specific information is of such a nature as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] b7D will be of delicate nature and will necessitate a classification above ~~Confidential~~ since a disclosure of this information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of ~~Confidential~~ will be adequate (U) if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(U)

1 - [redacted] (UNSUB, KGB ILLEGAL [redacted] b3 b6 b7C b7E
1 - [redacted] (SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES; ILLEGAL SUPPORT SECTION)
1 - (METHODS OF DETECTING ILLEGAL AGENTS IN US)
1 - (SOVIET NATIONALS EMPLOYED AT UN)
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

TJMcK: vc
(11)

~~SECRET~~ ENCLOSURE [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

MEMO

[redacted]

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least ~~Secret~~.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- , in the middle of 1962, advised .....". The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-24-2014 By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan ~~SECRET~~ DATE: 5-29-62

FROM : W. A. Branigan

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 -

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SUBJECT: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

(U) [redacted] is the [redacted] He also furnished information which has been considered from the standpoint of dissemination to other Government agencies.

Subject furnished the following information which is not being disseminated because it is not considered to add anything sufficiently specific or significant to that already known and which would warrant dissemination:

(U) 1. Information that during the period 1942 to 1951 the Soviets had informants who furnished information regarding atomic research in the U.S. He identified the Rosenbergs, Allan Nunn May and Klaus Fuchs as among these sources. (S)

(U) 2. Information that Guy Burgess and Donald Maclean who defected to the Soviet Union from Great Britain were connected with Soviet military intelligence and furnished atomic data for a long time before defecting, perhaps 8 or 10 years. (S)

(U) 3. [redacted] Martin and Mitchell, National Security Agency employees who defected to the Soviet Union, [redacted] shortly after their arrival in Moscow. Subject said he knew nothing about them except they went to the Soviet Union by way of Cuba. (S)

The following data is considered of possible interest to other Government agencies and appropriate dissemination is being made:

REC 38 [redacted]

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(U) 1. Information that the problem of intercepting missiles has been solved by the USSR and that warheads of antimissile missiles are filled with clean material so there will be no dangerous radioactive fallout over the Soviet Union. (S)

25 JUN 6 1962

(U) 2. There is a special KGB school near Moscow at which lectures are given consisting of up-to-date information regarding various types of atomic weapons. (S)

[redacted]

Enc. (7)
JJT:cgw

CLASSIFIED BY [redacted]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

6 JUN 1962

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~~SECRET~~

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(U) 3. Information that American employees were developed as sources for the Soviets in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in 1961, one of whom helped KGB agents open the Ambassador's safe so the KGB agents could photograph documents (S)

(U) 4. Information that the Soviets have obtained plans for computers being developed in California and at the University of Illinois. (S)

(U) 5 [redacted] (S)

ACTION:

Attached are letters disseminating pertinent information to the Attorney General, Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell, the Secretary of State and the Office of Security, Department of State, with copies to CIA, ONI, OSI, ACSI and AEC.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-24-2014 By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. SULLIVAN

DATE: 5-28-62

FROM : MR. BRANIGAN

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. Whitson

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b7D

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
(U) [redacted] (S)
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

[redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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(U) [redacted] (S) was interviewed at that time by ASAC Schmit and SA F. S. Putnam. He was again interviewed on the evening of 5-23-62 by ASAC Schmit and SAs V. J. Cahill and H. E. Morris, Jr.

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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OBSERVATIONS:

(U) [redacted]

NOT RECORDED

(U) [redacted] (S)

5-8-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60242/uls/baw/mc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

LW:hrt
(7)

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65 JUN 18 1962

JUN 8 1962

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SENT DIRECTOR
5-29-62

5-29

ORIGINAL FILED IN

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(U) MEMO FOR MR. SULLIVAN
RE: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

NEW YORK'S ANALYSIS:

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

b6
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b7D

MEMO FOR MR. SULLIVAN
(U) RE: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

[redacted]

ACTION:

For information. This will be further analyzed upon receipt of additional data from New York regarding their proposed action. Dissemination being handled separately.

I am not inclined to down grade this information. We have learned of so many operations about which we had had no information it is reasonable to believe the above report

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-24-2014 By J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: May 29, 1962

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Whitson

SUBJECT: UNKNOWN SUBJECT;
(U) [redacted] (S)
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

[redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

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~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

~~CLASSIFIED BY 60267 DIS/Bawlmc~~ 5-6-03
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6~~

A memorandum from Branigan to you on 5-28-62 reported information concerning an individual identified as [redacted]

(U) [redacted] The information was furnished by [redacted] (S)

Supervisor E. Cahill, NYO, advised on 5-29-62 that during the interview with the source on the evening of 5-28-62 the following details concerning this matter were obtained and, according to the source, he has no further information. [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

DEM:td (2)

XEROX JUN 8 1962

SENT DIRECTOR 5-29-62

~~SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED
170 JUN 8 1962

ORIGINAL FILED IN

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(U) UNKNOWN SUBJECT; [redacted] (S)
IS-RUSSIA

SECRET

[redacted]
IS-RUSSIA

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] The source claims this was all of the information he has but he was instructed to be most alert and try to obtain any possible additional information. (S)

ACTION:

(U) We are following this closely and New York has been instructed to follow [redacted] actions most carefully to try to identify the source involved. NY has also been instructed to conduct a survey with regard to what additional coverage, including technical coverage, can be established and to follow this investigation most closely. NY will, of course, follow with the source to obtain any other possible information. (S)

This should be given top priority.

RSAC Solomit advised 6/1/62 Date

SECRET

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-24-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Evans
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - [redacted]

The Attorney General June 4, 1962

b6
b7C

Director, FBI

(U) SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (S)

My letter dated May 31, 1962, furnished information obtained from a sensitive and confidential source with whom contact has been insufficient to determine reliability of information furnished but who has a background in Soviet intelligence.

(U) This same source has now advised that a Soviet KGB (Committee for State Security) officer has been given an assignment to determine the opinion of American scientists regarding the Congress on Disarmament which is to be held in Moscow during July, 1962. The source also learned that the Soviets have an agent connected with the Security Service at the United Nations (UN) and source was advised that a man (not further described) had been told by the Attorney General of the United States that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has knowledge of Soviet intelligence activity at the UN and could at any time "repeat the Igor Melekh pickup." You will recall that Igor Melekh was arrested on October 27, 1960, and charged with espionage but was permitted to return to the USSR without trial. (S)

The above is furnished for your information and due to the sensitive nature of our source, it is requested that it be closely held.

6-9-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267AIS/baw/mc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

100-354839

[redacted]

1 - New York by separate cover

1 0 [redacted]

NOT RECORDED
191 JUN 5 1962

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ETT:cgw
(10)
Cover memo Branigan to Sullivan 6-1-62 ETT:cgw re [redacted]

NOTE: ~~Top~~ Secret to protect our source [redacted]

~~TOP SECRET~~

DUPLICATE YELLOW

JUN 5 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-24-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~For SECRET~~

L - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - [redacted] b6 b7C

(C) 100-354839

BY LIAISON

Date: May 31, 1962

To: Office of Security
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

(U) Subject: [SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] (S)

A sensitive confidential source who has a background in Soviet intelligence but with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of information furnished has supplied the data set forth herein. Due to the sensitive nature of our source, it is requested this information be closely held.

(U) [redacted] stated b6 b7C b7D that the problem of intercepting missiles had been solved. [redacted] also reportedly stated that the warheads of antimissile missiles were filled with clean material so there would be no dangerous radioactive fallout over the Soviet Union. (S)

(U) Source stated there is a special KGB (Committee for State Security) school located approximately twenty-five kilometers east of Moscow on the road to Gorki. Lectures given at this school are for indoctrination and background and consist of up-to-date information regarding various types of atomic weapons. (S)

(U) Source further advised that he learned from a KGB representative that a number of sources were developed by the KGB among American employees at the United States Embassy in Moscow in 1961. One of the American employees helped KGB agents open the Ambassador's safe in the Embassy and KGB agents photographed documents that were in the safe. (S)

(U) Source also volunteered that the Soviets have obtained plans for a so-called "Lightning" computer being developed in California and which is capable of making ten million calculations per second. He said the Soviets have also (S)

1 [redacted] 10/3/03 b3 b7E

JJT:cgw
(14)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

JUN 6 1962

~~For SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN [redacted]

~~Top Secret~~

Office of Security
Department of State

(U) obtained complete plans for two computers which were developed at the University of Illinois. He named these computers as the "Illiack" and the "Silliack" and said they are capable of three million calculations per second. He has no information as to how the Soviets obtained these plans. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency
BY LIAISON

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence BY LIAISON

1 - Office of Special Investigations
Air Force
BY LIAISON

Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Division

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
BY LIAISON

Attention: Chief, Security Division

1 - Director, Division of Security
Atomic Energy Commission
BY LIAISON

Cover memo Brannigan to Sullivan 5-29-62 JJT:cgw re [redacted] b7D

NOTE: ~~Top~~ Secret to protect our source, [redacted]

~~Top Secret~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN DATE: May 29, 1962

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Evans
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SUBJECT: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

10/3/03 CLASSIFIED BY 60226 7/WLS/Branigan AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6

[redacted] is the [redacted] and the following is a summary of the information obtained.

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S) (U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] recently told the source that he had heard from an unnamed Soviet that this Soviet had recently talked to Attorney General Robert Kennedy and the Attorney General had said that the FBI has knowledge of Soviet activities at the United Nations and the FBI can at any time they choose repeat the IGOR MELEKH pick up (Melekh is the Soviet who was attached to the United Nations Secretariat and arrested for espionage activities, but subsequently the charge was dismissed and he was permitted to return to the Soviet Union). (S)

REC-52

(U) [redacted] also told the source "we have a [redacted] United Nations security" and this source tells the Soviets of activity of UN security personnel. (S)

JUN 5 1962

(U) [redacted] also told the source that not long ago a Soviet citizen who was an "illegal" KGB agent defected in Helsinki. According to [redacted] (S)

DEM:td (8)

60 JUN 8 1962

~~SECRET~~

SENT DIRECTOR
5-29-62

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~~SECRET~~

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MR. MOORE - MR. SULLIVAN

[redacted]

IS-RUSSIA

(U) [redacted]

(U) The informant was shown photographs of Soviets assigned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations and identified 20 individuals as being KGB agents and 4 individuals as being GRU agents.

ACTION:

For information. Full details of the interview are being sent by airtel. The source agreed to meet with Agents again on the evening of May 31.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - [redacted] b6 b7C

June 4, 1962

BY LIAISON

Rear Admiral V. L. Lowrance
Director of Naval Intelligence
Room 5C572
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.

6-9-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/Baustmc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT~~
~~WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~ b6 b7C b7D

Dear Admiral Lowrance:

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

You will be kept promptly advised of any additional information which we develop in this matter.

1 - New York by separate cover
ETT:cgw (9)

Sincerely yours,

1 - [redacted] b3 b7D b7E

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~ENCLOSURE~~

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Rear Admiral V. L. Lowarance

NOTE: ~~Top Secret~~ because the information reported herein was furnished by [redacted]

Cover memo Branigan to Sullivan 6-1-62 ETT:cgw Re" [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

W. C. Sullivan 6-1-62

W. A. Branigan

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

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(U) [redacted] (S)

ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

(U) [redacted] (S)

NY has recommended against dissemination of this information to the Office of Naval Intelligence at this time in order to protect [redacted] (U) NY considers it possible that additional information forthcoming from [redacted] coupled with investigation of [redacted] will identify [redacted] (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

While the necessity for protecting [redacted] is recognized, it felt that this information is so specific and is of such nature that the Bureau would be severely criticized in the future for not disseminating it. It is recommended, therefore, that the attached letter to Rear Admiral V. L. Lowrance be delivered by liaison at which time the Admiral will be advised of the possibility that we will subsequently identify [redacted] and requested not to take any action which would jeopardize this possibility or compromise our source. The Admiral will be requested to hold this information very close but to make available to us any information which he feels might be of assistance in identifying the officer. (S)

(U)

Enc.
ETT:cgw
(7)
1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

6-9-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 DIS/Bauer mc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

[redacted]

NOT RECORDED
170 JUN 8 1962

~~SECRET~~

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - [redacted]

(U) (S)

(U) ~~1 - 134839~~

BY LIAISON

Date: June 4, 1962

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

To: Office of Security
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

(U) Subject: [SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] (S)

A confidential source has reported that the KGB (U) (Committee for State Security) in the Soviet Union has expressed the desire to obtain the opinion of American scientists regarding the Congress on Disarmament which is to be held in Moscow during July, 1962. It was indicated that 2,000 persons are expected to attend this Congress from all over the world but the manner in which the KGB intends to obtain the opinion of American scientists was not indicated. (S)

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 11S/Bawlmc 5-15-03
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

BY LIAISON

1 - Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

1 - Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army

BY LIAISON

Attention: Chief, Security Division

1 - Office of Special Investigations
Air Force

BY LIAISON

[redacted]

Attention: Chief, Counterintelligence Division

RECORDED
INDEXED
JUN 6 1962

1 - Director of Naval Intelligence

BY LIAISON

1 - Director, Division of Security
Atomic Energy Commission

BY LIAISON

1 - New York by separate cover
1 - [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Cover memo Branigan to Sullivan 6-1-62 ETT:cgw re [redacted]

ETT:cgw
(15)

50 JUN 14 1962

NOTE: ~~Confidential~~ because it was obtained from [redacted] however it is of such general nature that more than ~~Confidential~~ classification is not believed warranted.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
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~~SECRET~~

6/12/62

PLAIN TEXT

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(U)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted] (S)

(U)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] (S)

(U) SUBJECT: [EUGENE RABINOWITZ] (S)
IS - R

[redacted]
IS - R

(U)

ReBuairtel, 6/11/62, captioned [EUGENE RABINOWITZ] (S) IS-R".

The following information was received on 6/4/62 from [redacted]:

NO INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THIS INFORMANT SHOULD BE DISSEMINATED OUTSIDE THE BUREAU UNLESS IT CAN BE SUITABLY PARAPHRASED TO INSURE THE INFORMANT'S PROTECTION AGAINST DISCLOSURE.

In setting forth information paraphrased suitable for dissemination the following terminology is suggested:

"Field Office T- in the middle of 1962 advised..."

The informant is currently characterized as an individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

(U)

4 - Bureau [redacted] (S) (RM)
1 - [redacted]
(U) 2 - Springfield (RM)
1 - [redacted] (S)
(U) 1 - [redacted] (S)

GAD:dmg
(10)

[redacted]

NOT RECORDED
198 JUN 15 1962

50 JUN 15 1962

5-15-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 DIS/Saw/mc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

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~~SECRET~~

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(U) [redacted] (S)

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above ~~"Confidential"~~ since disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a very detrimental effect on international relations and the national defense. In all other instances a classification of ~~"Confidential"~~ will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased. (S)

b7D

(U) Informant stated that Professor EUGENE RABINOWITZ, age 66 to 70 years, a famous scientist in the field of biology and a teacher at the University of Illinois, attended the "Biological Conference" held in Moscow, USSR, in August, 1961, and was in the Soviet Union for about three weeks. According to the informant, RABINOWITZ resides at Urbana, Illinois. While RABINOWITZ was in Moscow, the KGB (Committee of State Security) became interested in him and agents of the Second Department of the KGB established that he had several mistresses in Moscow. The KGB put microphones in the apartment of one of his mistresses, a Jewish woman approximately 38 years of age. By this means the KGB recorded their intimate conversations and also obtained photographs of them in compromising situations. [redacted] at this time he does not recall the woman's name. (S)

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(U) [redacted] (S)

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(U) [redacted] (S)

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The informant further advised that [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Informant also recalled that the Second Department of the KGB had taken a picture of RABINOWITZ and his mistress as they walked along Red Square in Moscow. (S)

(U) Informant said that RABINOWITZ is a famous scientist and his name is mentioned prominently in the early pages of the American book "Brighter Than One Thousand Suns". (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Informant advised that the KGB also is interested in RABINOWITZ, or was as of the last knowledge informant had of the case, because he has a number of friends among scientists. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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b7E

(U) at the Argonne National Laboratories. The KGB wanted to develop RABINOWITZ, but believed that he would not be cooperative. When they found that his mistress was anti-Soviet, they began to try to determine if they could do something to get to RABINOWITZ through her. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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The informant stated that it is possible that (U) RABINOWITZ's mistress, who is definitely a Soviet citizen, might have been in some capacity working for the Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). He stated that based on his knowledge of the case, however, he feels that she is not working for the GRU and that she is definitely and truly anti-Soviet. (S)

(U) NYO indices failed to reflect any additional information which could be identified with RABINOWITZ. (S)

(U) Springfield Office should check their indices regarding EUGENE RABINOWITZ and furnish any information which would tend to refute or substantiate the information supplied by the informant. (S)

(U) Springfield should bear in mind that even though the informant has no knowledge of the KGB having contacted RABINOWITZ, the possibility exists that the KGB may have contacted him in the past or may use the information they possess regarding RABINOWITZ to attempt to compromise him in the future. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

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(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) The Springfield Office should furnish the NYO a copy of pertinent communications re [redacted] RABINOWITZ. (S)

(U) The NYO is opening a [redacted] file on RABINOWITZ in this matter and may receive additional information re RABINOWITZ which may influence instant investigation. Any additional information received from source re RABINOWITZ will be immediately furnished to Springfield and the Bureau. (S)

~~SECRET~~

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: May 31, 1962

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan

SUBJECT: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA
[redacted]

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ASAC Schmit, NYO, advised that New York was scheduled to meet with captioned source on the evening of 5-31-62. He said, however, in accordance with prior arrangements, the source telephonically contacted the NYO at 3 PM 5-31 and advised that it was necessary for him to attend a "Party meeting" at 6:30 PM, 5-31, and he would, therefore, not be able to meet with Agents of the New York Office as scheduled. He agreed, however, to meet on the evening of 6-1-62.

ACTION:

For information.

DEM:td (6)

[redacted]

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EX-114

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-8-03 BY 60267 NLS/Baw/mc

REC-3

25 JUN 5 1962

60 JUN 12 1962

1 [redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

6/5/62

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

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To: SAC, New York [redacted]

From: Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]
IS - R

A wire service release under date of 6/1/62 carried a news item date lined at Chicago to the effect that Indianapolis, Indiana, television commentator, Frank Edwards (Station WTTV), has prepared an article appearing in the current issue of "Fate" magazine, a popular science journal. The article reported that five Soviet cosmonauts have died in space flights. Edwards wrote that these five do not constitute the complete list. He listed the lost cosmonauts as Terenity Shiborin, in 1959; Piotr Dolgov, in 1960; Massikevich Zavadosky, in 1961; and a Soviet man-and-woman moon exploration team which disappeared in May 1961. Edwards reportedly also stated that "missing and unaccounted for are two other graduates of the Soviet Space Training Center, Gennady Mikaolov and Alexey Belokonev."

(U) [redacted] he may possess pertinent information concerning the Soviet space effort of interest and value to certain U. S. Government agencies. It is accordingly desired that [redacted] Any tangible results should be submitted in form for dissemination under an appropriate caption such as "Soviet Space Effort." (S)

JJT:ah
(4)

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NS/Bowlme
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
5-8-03

MAILED 8
JUN - 1962
COMM-FBI

REC-29 [redacted]

E26 "M.I.C.R. BRANCH"
INSPECTOR
REC-D

JUN 6 1962

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

63 JUN 13 1962

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

UPI-29

(COSMONAUTS)

CHICAGO--AT LEAST FIVE SOVIET COSMONAUTS HAVE DIED IN SPACE FLIGHTS, AN INDIANAPOLIS, IND., TELEVISION COMMENTATOR SAID YESTERDAY IN A COPYRIGHT MAGAZINE ARTICLE.

THE ARTICLE BY NEWSMAN AND COMMENTATOR FRANK EDWARDS OF (STATION KTTV) APPEARS IN THE CURRENT ISSUE OF "FATE" MAGAZINE, A POPULAR SCIENCE JOURNAL.

"THE FIVE KNOWN RUSSIAN ASTRONAUTS (SIC) WHO HAVE LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE SOVIET SPACE PROGRAM...DO NOT CONSTITUTE THE COMPLETE LIST, OF THAT WE CAN BE SURE," EDWARDS WROTE.

HE LISTED THE LOST COSMONAUTS AS TERENITY SHIBORIN, IN 1959; PIOTR DOLGOV, IN 1960, MASSIKEVICH ZAVADOSKY, IN 1961, AND A SOVIET MAN-AND-WOMAN MOON EXPLORATION TEAM WHICH DISAPPEARED IN MAY, 1961.

EDWARDS SAID, "MISSING AND UNACCOUNTED FOR ARE TWO OTHER GRADUATES OF THE (SOVIET) SPACE TRAINING CENTER, GENNADY MIKAOLOV AND ALEXEY BELOKONEV."

6/1--GE944A

Airtel - New York
JJD:ah
6/5/62

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-8-03 BY 60267 NS/Bauhmc

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[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014
By: J89J28T90

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - [redacted]
1 - Liaison

(U) 100-354839

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

BY LIAISON

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Date: June 1, 1962

6-9-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NSIBaw/tmc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

To: Director
National Security Agency
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

(U) Subject: [SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] (S)

A sensitive confidential source [redacted] but with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of information furnished has supplied the data set forth herein. Due to the sensitive nature of our source, it is requested this information be closely held.

(U) The source has advised that the Soviets have obtained plans for a so-called "Lightning" computer being developed in California and which is capable of making ten million calculations per second. He said the Soviets have also obtained complete plans for two computers which were developed at the University of Illinois. He named these computers as the "Illiack" and the "Silliack" and said they are capable of three million calculations per second. He has no information as to how the Soviets obtained these plans. (S)

We would appreciate any information in your possession which would identify the computers referred to by the source and which would indicate their application and use on United States Government work.

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
(U) ETT:eg (UNSUB; Soviet efforts to obtain Computer Data) (S)
(7)

NOTE: (U) This is disseminated to NSA inasmuch as that Agency is known to have made extensive use of computers and is most likely to have information which would assist in identifying these computers. The source in this matter is [redacted] LA, SF and SI have been instructed to obtain information regarding these computers but it is felt that NSA can also furnish pertinent material. ~~Top Secret~~ to protect our source, [redacted]

NOT RECORDED
128 JUN 5 1962

53 JUN 11 1962

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014
By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: May 23, 1962

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Evans
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan

SUBJECT: ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

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Subject was born 3-27-22 in Moscow and arrived in the United States at New York City for the first time on 11-29-61. He is employed as a consultant, Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation, United Nations Secretariat. He is a scientist, having received his doctor's degree in chemistry from Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute and immediately prior to coming to the United States has been head of the Radio Chemical Laboratory of the Nuclear Energy Institute, Moscow Academy of Science. He resides in Room 302, Excelsior Hotel, New York City.

DEM:td (8)

~~SECRET~~

58 JUN 12 1962

JUN 7 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON:

~~SECRET~~

MR. MOORE - MR. SULLIVAN
ALEKSEI ISIDOROVICH KULAK
IS-RUSSIA

b6
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b7D

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) The informant advised that Boris Ivanov is head of the KGB in New York [redacted] previously stated this) and that the KGB residency is broken down into three branches - (1) political: (2) scientific and technical and (3) security. Kulak is in the scientific and technical branch. (S)

(U) [redacted] ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MR. MOORE - MR. SULLIVAN
ALEKSEI I. KULAK
IS-RUSSIA

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(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

MR. MOORE - MR. SULLIVAN
ALEKSEI I. KULAK
IS-RUSSIA

~~SECRET~~

OBSERVATIONS

(U) [redacted] (S)

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ACTION

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014
By: J89J28T90

~~TOP SECRET~~

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - [redacted]

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b7E

May 31, 1962

BY LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Honorable Dean Rusk
The Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

6-9-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 AIS/Baw/mc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 4b

My dear Mr. Rusk:

A sensitive confidential source [redacted] with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of information furnished has supplied the data set forth herein. Due to the sensitive nature of our source, it is requested this information be closely held.

(U) [redacted]

(U) Source stated there is a special KGB (Committee for State Security) school located approximately twenty-five kilometers east of Moscow on the road to Gorki. Lectures given at this school are for indoctrination and background and consist of up-to-date information regarding various types of atomic weapons.

(U) Source further advised that he learned from a KGB representative that a number of sources were developed by the KGB among American employees at the United States Embassy in Moscow in 1961. One of the American employees helped KGB agents open the Ambassador's safe in the Embassy and KGB agents photographed documents that were in the safe.

(U) Source also volunteered that the Soviets have obtained plans for a so-called "Lightning" computer being developed in California and which is capable of making ten million calculations per second. He said the Soviets have also

100-354839
JJT:cgw
(8)
1- [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

53 JUN 11 1962

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Honorable Dean Rusk

(U) obtained complete plans for two computers which were developed at the University of Illinois. He named these computers as the "Illiack" and the "Silliack" and said they are capable of three million calculations per second. He has no information as to how the Soviets obtained these plans. (S)

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(U) [redacted] (S)

b7D

Sincerely yours,

Cover memo Branigan to Sullivan 5-29-62 JJT:cgw re [redacted]

NOTE: ~~Top Secret~~ to protect our source, [redacted]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014
By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach b3
Evans b6
Malone
Rosen b7C
Sullivan
Tavel b7D
Trotter
Tele. Room b7E
Holmes
Gandy

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: May 24, 1962

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Evans
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan

SUBJECT: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

[redacted] NYO, furnished the following highlights of the information obtained.

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) He furnished the breakdown of the KGB residency in New York, the people in charge of each branch of the residency and he identified 53 intelligence agents in the GRU and KGB. He will be able to identify other individuals as photographs are shown to him. He ad- (S)

DEM:td (8)

EC-52

[redacted]

JUN 7 1962

~~SECRET~~

5-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/Bawtmc-AMG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

51 JUN 13 1962

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

MR. MOORE - MR. SULLIVAN
[redacted]
IS-RUSSIA

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) The source advised that [redacted] at [redacted] is an important KGB agent [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] furnished information concerning Rudolf Abel and said that Abel is now retired on a pension. He said that at KGB headquarters in their special library there is a 20-volume report on the Abel case and it states that Abel made only two mistakes - (1) he gave out a hollowed coin with microfilm in it - (2) after (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MR. MOORE - MR. SULLIVAN ~~SECRET~~ b7D

[redacted]
IS-RUSSIA

(U) he had good reason to be alerted to the fact that the FBI was watching his studio, he still went back to get his personal things, he was too greedy. (Our informant [redacted] told us he had been similarly advised that Abel made a mistake in going back for his things and that he was too greedy). (S)

(U) With regard to Abel's operation, the source stated that he has the impression that while Abel was in the United States he furnished information in the atomic energy field. He believes that Abel had about three other illegal agents working with him. [redacted] b7D b7E

[redacted] A review is being made of Abel's correspondence for any information of interest in light of this information). (S)

The above are the highlights of the information furnished and full details are being submitted by New York. [redacted]

[redacted] was introduced to the Agents who will be meeting with him in the future, Vincent J. Cahill and Harry E. Morris, Jr. and he indicated no reluctance in meeting additional personnel.

ACTION:

For information. On receipt of full details from New York you will be advised of any additional pertinent information and you will be kept advised of developments.

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014
By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

Date: 5/23/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

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Re New York telephone call to Inspector DONALD E. MOORE, a.m. of 5/23/62, which furnished information concerning [redacted]

(U) [redacted] spoke with IC [redacted] and advised [redacted] referred the information to Night Supervisor [redacted] SA [redacted] upon being assured of the authenticity of the above, notified ASAC SCHMIT and SA FORREST S. PUTMAN, who both proceeded to the New York Office for the purpose of interviewing the above individual.

[redacted] furnished the following information to ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT and SA FORREST S. PUTMAN.

(3) - [redacted]
1 -

MCT - 46

[redacted]

FSP:gmm
(5)

5-13-03 AAG
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 AIS/Baumgartner REC-52
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

C C - Wick

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MAY 1962

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

Informant furnished the following background information concerning himself:

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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~~SECRET~~

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U) the Soviet Mission to the United Nations have separate Secret rooms. He also advised that only the head man of KGB in the New York area, whom he identified [redacted] has access to the code room with the exception of [redacted] verified by [redacted].

(U) Informant further advised that every Saturday, KGB agents assigned to the United Nations Secretariat and Soviet correspondents must report to the Soviet Mission and report to the "boss" on their activities during the past week. KGB personnel at Amtorg Trading Corporation must report to the Mission every Friday for the same reason as above, to report their activities for the past week. Informant advised that KGB agents working out of the Soviet Mission are readily available to the KGB boss for interview and consultation concerning their activity and work. (S)

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[redacted]

(U) Informant advised that both the KGB and the GRU are monitoring FBI radio transmissions and that the KGB is presently utilizing equipment in their automobile to detect and monitor FBI radio transmissions which are out of the radius of the Soviet Mission (S) (verified by [redacted].

(U) Informant further stated that Soviet agents contact their agents through the use of personal contacts and drops and by the use of undeveloped film placed in the drops (S) (verified by [redacted].

Informant asked if we would be interested in the name of the American whom the Soviets consider to be their best operative agent. When advised yes he stated, "I will tell you tomorrow".

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted] stated it is the general rule that meetings are prohibited in Manhattan with the exception of the Greenwich Village area.

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[redacted] stated that the United States Government is (U) presently developing a high speed calculating machine in California which can make 10,000 computations per second. He said that even though this machine is only in the development stage, the Soviets have the plans and he indicated he knew how they obtained this data. [redacted] also stated that the Soviets are buying special military techniques through Amtorg Trading Corporation. (S)

(U) [redacted] has many connections with United States scientists from whom he is obtaining information. (S)

[redacted] estimated that the KGB spends approximately (U) $150,000 per month for intelligence information including technical equipment. He says they have an unlimited budget. (S)

[redacted] advised that the KGB is divided into three (U) sections: one, political; two, scientific and technical; and three, security. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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(U) [redacted] would be similar to the Lonsdale case in that they would receive and transmit their messages to the Soviet Union by radio direct. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

The above information confirms information furnished the Bureau telephonically by ASAC SCHMIT and it is noted that

b7D

[redacted]

The New York Office is closely following this matter and the Bureau will be advised of all developments and to further insure the protection of the identity of this informant. [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

6-5-62

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Airtel

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014
By: J89J28T90

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To: SAC, New York

From: Director, FBI [redacted]

[redacted]
IS - R

Reurairtels dated 5-23, 24 and 29-62.

(U) It is noted that [redacted]

(S) Subsequent airtels have not furnished this information. You should promptly [redacted] and take appropriate action to open investigation, if this has not already been done.

(U) [redacted]

[redacted] NY should open individual cases on each of these unsubs and press the source for additional information concerning them either in his possession at the present time or to obtain additional information in the future, if possible. Interrogation of other Soviets [redacted] has indicated that if they are questioned on a number of occasions regarding the same subject matter they repeatedly are able to recall additional information which is of assistance in identifying unsubs. These matters should, therefore be given constant and continuous attention. (S)

ETT:cgw
(4)

[redacted]

EX 100

19 JUN 6 1962

JUN 13 1962

MAIL ROOM [X] TELETYPE UNIT [ ]

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5-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60324 UC/Baw/mc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

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Airtel to SAC, New York
Re: [redacted]

(U) On page 12 of urairtel 5-24-62 it is indicated that [redacted] who is in the special branch of the KGB is in contact with individuals who work in industrial plants primarily in Brooklyn. His target is to identify individuals who would commit sabotage on behalf of the Soviets in the event of hostilities. As you know, general information has been received in the past indicating that the Soviets have trained personnel in sabotage and have plans for sabotage in the event of an emergency. This, however, represents the first specific information we have obtained in this regard. It is desired, therefore, that this question of sabotage plans be carefully explored with the source to obtain all information in his possession or which he can obtain in the future as to Soviet plans, identity of Soviet personnel who have this assignment and the identity of agents recruited by them. It is believed that this matter should be subject of a separate investigative case file to correlate information and to make certain that every step is taken to explore it. (S)

[redacted]

[redacted] The necessity for proper protection of the source is recognized by the Bureau [redacted] It is desired, therefore, that NY promptly obtain from the source a general statement concerning his knowledgability [redacted]

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

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Airtel to SAC, New York
Re: [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

The above matter should be handled promptly and you should keep the Bureau advised of all developments in this case.

(U) Attention is also called to the fact that source has advised that on the 4th floor of the Soviet UN Delegation there is a room designated solely for radio and code purposes. The only entrance is through the office of the section chief and in addition to the section chief the only Soviets allowed entry are the 2 code men and one radio operator. You should endeavor to obtain from source the identity of the radio operator and the nature of his duties and functions particularly with respect to monitoring activity. (S)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~ FBI

Date: 6/5/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b3
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b7E

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] (ADM)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
~~IS-R~~

ReNYairtel, 6/4/62, in captioned case.

[redacted] was interviewed by SAS HARRY E. MORRIS, JR., and VINCENT J. CAHILL [redacted]

Results of this interview are being forwarded this date by separate airtel.

[redacted]

[redacted]

3 - [redacted] (RM)
1 - Washington Field (INFO) (RM)
1 - [redacted] (ADM)

REC- 38 [redacted]

VJC:ad
(9)

5-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60226 AUC/Baw/mc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

18 JUN 6 1962

cc - Wick

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

53 JUN 12 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
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[redacted]

[redacted]

Informant stated that [redacted] as related in separate airtel, this date, he has had no opportunity as yet to prepare the breakdown chart of the KGB Intelligence Organization in Moscow. This matter will be pressed at the next meeting.

[redacted]

The above information was furnished on a highly confidential basis and is not to be made public except in the usual proceeding following the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.

This, of course, is at variance with the statement made by the informant on 6/1/62, as reported in referenced airtel of 6/4/62.

[redacted]

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~~SECRET~~

The Bureau will be kept advised of developments in this case.

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014
By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~ FBI

Date: 5/29/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

~~CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UIS/Bawtinc-AAG~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X~~ 5-13-03 4,6

Re New York airtels, dated 5/24 and 25/62.

[redacted] was interviewed [redacted] by SAS HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. and VINCENT J. CAHILL.

(U)

[redacted] (5)

Informant appeared nervous initially at the outset of the interview, but as it progressed, he appeared to settle down and relax. Informant appeared to be cooperative and seemed to be earnestly trying to answer questions as specifically

3 - [redacted] (RM)
1 - [redacted] (ADM)

REC. [redacted]

VJC:vc
(6)

CC - [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

MAY 30 1962

JUN 1 1962

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

XEROX JUN 2 1962

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UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

~~SECRET~~ Date

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U) as possible. He had no hesitation in identifying photographs of Soviet nationals as intelligence agents. It is noted that

[redacted]

[redacted]

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b7D

[redacted]

On 5/29/62, SA MERRILL REESE checked appropriate sources

[redacted]

This matter will be resolved by interviewing agents [redacted]

this matter postponed

~~SECRET~~

Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-3-56)

FBI

Date: 6/6/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

Enclosed for the Bureau are 78 copies of dissemination memoranda containing information furnished by [redacted] to ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. on 5/23/62. These memoranda are for appropriate Bureau files.

Enclosed for WFO are 5 copies of the same memoranda for the appropriate WFO files.

This concludes dissemination of information furnished by the informant on 5/23/62.

3 - [redacted] (Encls. 78) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Encls. 5) (RM)
1 - [redacted] (INV)

TJMcK:vc
(5)

[redacted]

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-14-03 BY 60267 NIS/BaustmC

ENCLOSURE

E. G. Wick

74 encls. retained in case for future reference

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

57 JUN 18 1962

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

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~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] Date: 6/4/62

FROM : SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS-R

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

Source [redacted]

Date of Contact 5/23/62

Contacted by ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 6026 7015/Baum/mc-AAG~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X~~ 5-14-03 1,6

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so that dissemination is prohibited, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above ~~Confidential~~ since disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances a classification of ~~Confidential~~ will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased. (S)

(U)

1 [redacted]

COPIES CONTINUED

1 [redacted]

(U) 1 [redacted] (S)

(1) [redacted]

TJM:car
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~~SECRET~~

ENCLOSURE [redacted]

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(Soviet Nationals Employed at UN)
1
(Soviet Intelligence Services)

(S)

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If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least "~~Secret~~".

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"New York symbol in the middle of 1962 advised ....". The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) Soviets Employed at UN Secretariat, NYC (S)

(U) Informant was shown photographs, with names, of the following Soviets employed at the UN Secretariat, NYC. He could furnish no information regarding their affiliation with either the KGB or the GRU: (S)

(U)

(S)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

Informant has now been shown photographs of all
(U) Soviet nationals currently employed at the UN Secretariat in NYC. As a result he has identified 31 of these individuals as members either of the KGB or the GRU. (S)

(U) Soviet Intelligence Agents in Washington, D.C. (S)

Informant identified the following individuals by
(U) name. He did not observe a photograph of these individuals. (S)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

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TO: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] DATE: 6/4/62

FROM: SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

Source [redacted]

Date of Contact 5/23/62

Contacted By ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT,
SA VINCENT J. CAHILL and
SA HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so that dissemination is prohibited, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above ~~Confidential~~ since disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances a classification of ~~Confidential~~ will be adequate if the information relates to [redacted] and can be adequately paraphrased. (U) (S)

1 [redacted] (U) 1 - [redacted] (S)

COPIES CONTINUED
1 - [redacted] (INV) (1) - [redacted]

5-14-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 AIS/Baw/mc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

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ENCLOSURE [redacted]

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(U)

(Current Soviet Espionage and Subversive Activities)

1 - NY (100-92701)

1 - Bureau (62-77787-240)
(UN Personnel - USSR)

1 -

(Soviet Espionage Activities; Illegals Support Section)

1 - NY (100-60713)

1 - Bureau (100-183386)
(Tass News Agency)

1 -

(Soviet Intelligence Services)

1 -

(Soviet Nationals Employed at United Nations)

~~SECRET~~

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[redacted]

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least "~~Secret~~".

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"New York symbol in the middle of 1962 advised .....". The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) Soviet Intelligence Agents Considered By Informant To Have Important Contacts With Americans (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted]

Informant could not further identify these [redacted] nor could he describe [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Informant could furnish no descriptive information regarding [redacted] contacts of [redacted] Informant advised that [redacted] handles an illegal agent in this country, but that he could furnish no additional information concerning this agent. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

According to the informant, this individual handles mostly political contacts.

(U) [redacted] (S)

This individual, according to informant, has three American contacts who are in the radio and electronics fiel submarines and rockets.

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FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
MEMORANDUM

TO : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] Date: 6/5/62

FROM : SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS-R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Source [redacted]

Date of Contact 5/23/62

Contacted by ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT, SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

~~5-13-03~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY 60267 DIS/Baw/mc - AAG~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6~~

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so that dissemination is prohibited, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

(U) Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above ~~Confidential~~ since disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances a classification of ~~Confidential~~ will be adequate if the information relates to [Soviet nationals] (S) and can be adequately paraphrased.

1-[redacted]

1-Bureau (65-58236)
(JULIUS ROSENBERG)

COPIES CONTINUED
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(13)

ENCLOSURE [redacted]

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COPIES CONTINUED

(U) 1 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

1 [redacted]

(U) 1 [redacted]

1-Bureau (65-58805)
(KLAUS FUCHS) (S)
2-Bureau (62-106214)
[redacted]

(Current Soviet Espionage
and Subversive Activities)

1-[redacted] (S)
(Soviet Espionage Activities;
Illegal Support Section)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

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If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least ~~"Secret"~~.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

> "New York symbol in the middle of 1962 advised ....". The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

MISCELLANEOUS

Soviet Atomic Research Information

(U) Informant advised that during the period 1942-1951, the Soviets had informants who furnished information regarding atomic research in the US. The information was voluminous and he identified JULIUS ROSENBERG and wife, ALLAN NUNN MAY, and KLAUS FUCHS as among these sources. He stated that MAY and FUCHS were regarded as the most important sources. He also indicated that the Soviets had many contacts at Las Alamos during the period 1942-1951. Informant also advised that BRUNO PONTECORVO was working in a laboratory in Dubno, Russia, as late as 1960-1961. (S)

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Information Concerning "BURGESS" and "MAC LEAN"

(U) Informant stated that BURGESS and MAC LEAN, who defected to the Soviet Union from Great Britain, served in England furnishing atomic data for a long time before defecting, perhaps as long as eight or ten years. He advised that they were connected with Soviet Military Intelligence (GRU). (S)

Information Concerning "MARTIN and MITCHELL"

(U) Informant advised that [redacted] MARTIN and MITCHELL, NSA employees who defected to the Soviet Union. [redacted] He said that he knew nothing about them except that they went to the Soviet Union from the United States via Cuba, and then by steamer to Russia. (S)

(U) Information Concerning [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) KGB School Near Moscow (S)

(U) Informant advised that there is a special KGB School located approximately 25 kilometers east of Moscow on the road to Gorki. [redacted] (S)

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(U) Soviet Sources Among American Employees in United States Embassy in Moscow - 1961 (S)

(U) [redacted] agents of the KGB had received money awards for developing sources among American employees in the United States Embassy in Moscow in 1961. The informant said that one of the American employees at the United States Embassy helped KGB agents open the Ambassador's safe in the Embassy in order that the KGB agents could photograph the documents therein. Informant stated that he could not identify the exact location of the safe within the Embassy. (S)

(U) Soviets Interest in United States Computers (S)

(U) Informant advised that the Soviets have obtained plans for the "lightning" computer which is being developed in California. He stated that they have already obtained these plans, although it is still in the development stages. He said this computer is capable of making ten million calculations per second. (S)

(U) Informant stated that the Soviets have also obtained complete plans for two computers which were developed at the University of Illinois, each of which is capable of three million calculations per second. He named these computers as the "Illiack" and the "Silliack". He stated that he saw the plans for these computers in Moscow, but that he has no information concerning the method by which the Soviets acquired these plans. (S)

(U) Atomic Information Relative to Red China (S)

(U) Informant advised that [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] 6/4/62

SA [redacted]

[redacted]
IS - R

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b7C
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Source [redacted]

Date of Contact 5/23/62

Contacted By ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT,
SA VINCENT J. CAHILL and
SA HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED~~
~~HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT~~
~~WHERE~~ SHOWN OTHERWISE

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so that dissemination is prohibited, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

(U) Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above ~~Confidential~~ since disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances a classification of ~~Confidential~~ will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased.

1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted] (INV)

1 - Bureau (65-64538)
(RUDOLF IVANOVICH ABEL)
(U) 1 - [redacted]
(Soviet Espionage Activities; Illegals Support Section)
1 - [redacted]

TJH:gmm
(6)

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFIED BY 60267/DMH/Baw/mc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

[redacted]
ENCLOSURE

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[redacted]

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least "Secret".

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"New York symbol in the middle of 1962 advised .....". The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) Information Concerning Colonel RUDOLF IVANOVICH ABEL (S)

Informant advised that in 1959, ABEL, [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Informant also advised that another of ABEL's contacts in the United States was [redacted] The informant did not furnish any information concerning this individual's identity or current location. Informant advised that [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

(U) Informant stated that the ABEL Espionage ring transmitted information primarily concerning atomic energy matters and this information was obtained in the United States. Informant said further that the sources of information available to the ABEL ring seem to be located in Los Alamos. (S)

(U) Informant advised that he had no knowledge of anyone named REINO HAYHANEN ever having been associated with RUDOLF ABEL. (S)

(U) The informant advised that in KGB Headquarters in Moscow, there are approximately 20 volumes of material in a special library devoted to the activities and operations of the ABEL ring. (S)

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~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: 6/12/62

FROM : C. A. Evans

~~CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NISBaw/mc-AAG~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6~~

(U) SUBJECT: SOVIET PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (S)

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(U) Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach advised me that he had just received the original of the Director's letter to Kenneth O'Donnell at the White House dated May 31, 1962, concerning intelligence activities by Soviet personnel. (S) In this letter we advised the White House (similar letters went to Secretary Rusk, the Attorney General and the intelligence agencies) (U) of information received from one of our top informants as to Soviet intelligence activity. Included in the letter was information the Soviets had obtained the plans for electronic computers developed in California and at the University of Illinois. (S)

On the original of the Director's May 31, 1962 letter was a memorandum to the President from General Maxwell Taylor wherein he set forth more detailed information as to the electronic computers developed by the University of Illinois. In essence, these comments were to the effect this is still in the development stage and the project, which is on an AEC grant, is unclassified. General Taylor's memorandum and the Director's memorandum had been forwarded to the Attorney General by routing slip from Kenneth O'Donnell with a "please call me."

(U) The Deputy Attorney General said that the Attorney General had not spoken to him about this but he did have the correspondence on his desk with a penned notation to Katzenbach from the Attorney General as to what is being done to follow up on this. I told Katzenbach that the Soviet espionage targets in this country are of direct concern to the FBI and we are conducting (S) extensive and continuing investigation in this regard. Included in this would, (U) of course, be Soviet activity aimed at developing information concerning computers. (S) Katzenbach advised he thought this was a most satisfactory answer for him to give the Attorney General. He added that in view of the obvious interest in this matter, the Bureau might desire to continue bringing to the attention of the Attorney General and the White House any further developments.

ACTION TO BE TAKEN:

(U) There is no immediate action required. We will continue to advise the White House and the Attorney General by memorandum of any pertinent developments in connection with this phase of Soviet espionage activity. (S)

1 - Mr. Sullivan
CAE:maw
(6)

~~SECRET~~

100-354839

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-[illegible]

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

MR. SULLIVAN

MR. BRANIGAN

5-28-62
1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - [redacted]
1 - Mr. Whitson

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

UNKNOWN SUBJECT;

(U) [redacted] (S)

INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

[redacted]

INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

[redacted] was interviewed at that time by ASAC Schmit and SA [redacted] He was again interviewed on the evening of 5-23-62 by ASAC Schmit and SAs V. J. Cahill and H. E. Morris, Jr.

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

OBSERVATIONS:

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

LW:hrt
(7)

5-13-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267015BawlmC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

NOT RECORDED
8 JUN 8

~~SECRET~~

DEC 12 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

(U) [redacted] FOR [redacted]
RE: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

NEW YORK'S ANALYSIS:

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7D

MEMO FOR MR. SULLIVAN
(U) RE: UNKNOWN SUBJECT; [redacted] (S)
[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

(U) Information received previously from [redacted] has indicated the Soviets are desperately attempting to penetrate American intelligence through any means and on any level. It is possible that they have developed a source [redacted] for example has said that the Soviet intelligence service assumes and feels that the UN building is overrun with FBI Agents. New York, nevertheless, assuming that [redacted] (S)

ACTION:

For information. This will be further analyzed upon receipt of additional data from New York regarding their proposed action.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - [redacted]

6-9-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 DIS/BaW/mc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6
#971574

May 31, 1962

BY LIAISON

b3
b6
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b7E

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell
Special Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington 25, D. C.

My dear Mr. O'Donnell:

A sensitive confidential source who has a background in Soviet intelligence but with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of information furnished has supplied the data set forth herein. Due to the sensitive nature of our source, it is requested this information be closely held.

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Source stated there is a special KGB (Committee for State Security) school located approximately twenty-five kilometers east of Moscow on the road to Gorki. Lectures given at this school are for indoctrination and background and consist of up-to-date information regarding various types of atomic weapons.

(U) Source further advised that he learned from a KGB representative that a number of sources were developed by the KGB among American employees at the United States Embassy in Moscow in 1961. One of the American employees helped KGB agents open the Ambassador's safe in the Embassy and KGB agents photographed documents that were in the safe. (S)

NOT RECORDED
87

(U) Source also volunteered that the Soviets have obtained plans for a so-called "Lightning" computer being developed in California and which is capable of making ten million calculations per second. He said the Soviets have also (S)

JJT:cgw 100-354839
(8) JUN 11 1962
1 - [redacted]

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

~~TOP~~ SECRET

Honorable P. Kenneth O'Donnell

(U) obtained complete plans for two computers which were developed at the University of Illinois. He named these computers as the "Illiack" and the "Silliack" and said they are capable of three million calculations per second. He has no information as to how the Soviets obtained these plans. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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The foregoing information has been furnished to the Attorney General, the Secretary of State and intelligence agencies.

Sincerely yours,

Cover memo Branigan to Sullivan 5-29-62 JJT:cgw re [redacted]

NOTE: ~~Top Secret~~ to protect source, [redacted]

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 6/6/62

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b7E

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

Re Bureau airtel to New York, dated 6/5/62, regarding the article by television commentator FRANK EDWARDS (Station WTTV, Indianapolis, Indiana) appearing in the current issue of "Fate" magazine, a popular science journal. This article reported that five Soviet cosmonauts have died in space flights.

It is suggested that the Bureau might desire to have Indianapolis and/or Chicago contact commentator EDWARDS or the wire service regarding the source of the material appearing in the article and any other details available.

New York will interrogate [redacted] regarding this matter as soon as feasible and will submit the results to the Bureau under the caption suggested by the Bureau, "Soviet Space Effort" (U)

3 - [redacted] (RM)
1 - [redacted] (INV)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

HEM: vc
(5)

REC- 62 [redacted]

CLASSIFIED BY 6062/NIS/Baw/vc HAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

EX-115

16 JUN 7 1962

~~SECRET~~

53 JUN 13 1962

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M _____ Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Evans
Mr. Malone
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

b3
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b7E

Date: 5/25/62

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL RM (Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

IMMEDIATE ATTENTION:
INSPECTOR DONALD E. MOORE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
~~WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE~~

(U) ReNYairtel 5/24/62, captioned as above, with particular reference to data contained on page 16. [redacted] (S)

(U) It is felt that the matter which was being discussed with the informant at this particular time is significant. [redacted] was unable to furnish any further enlightening information. (S)

(U) It is the opinion of the NYO that this information should be and will be given very careful attention and analysis in an attempt to resolve [redacted] (S)

5-11-83
CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NSIBaw/MC-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

REC-27

3- [redacted] (RM)
1- [redacted]

20 MAY 26 1962

JLS:HMF
(7)

memo Hoover to Sullivan 5/25/62 CLW

CC - WFO

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

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(U) carefully reviewing his file and past contacts to determine if we can identify any individual who might fall in this category. (S)

(U) It is to be noted that [redacted] an investigation by the NYO, may prove helpful. We will, of course, carefully analyze his investigative file. (S)

In analyzing the information as it now stands, the following possibilities exist:

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) (2) Information received previously [redacted] has indicated that the Soviets are desperately attempting to penetrate American intelligence through any means and on any level. It is possible that they have developed a source [redacted] for example, has said that the Soviet Intelligence Service assumes and feels that the UN building is overrun with FBI Agents. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

The Bureau- is assured that we are closely examining this allegation and the Bureau will be kept promptly advised of developments.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM: FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 6/6/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: IS - R

9-10
10-11

5-15-03 CLASSIFIED BY 60267 AIS/Baw/MC-MAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

ReNYairtel, 6/5/62.

Information in this airtel consists of additional information furnished on 6/4/62 to SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. Other information obtained from on 6/4/62 was set out in referenced airtel.

(U) It is pointed out for the information of the Bureau and WFO, in regard to the comparison of identifications of Soviets set out in this airtel, that while (S)

(U) In this regard, it is understandable there are some instances where has identified certain Soviets as agents of the KGB, based on his own observations and conclusions, while has not been able to identify (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

REC-1

3 - (RM)
2 - Washington Field (RM)
1 - (Inv.)

HEM:dmg
(10)

18 JUN 1962

EX 100

~~SECRET~~ ESP

Approved: Sent M Per

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: ~~SECRET~~

Transmit the following in _____ (Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) these individuals as KGB personnel. It is believed that as time progresses, [redacted] will become much more knowledgeable and will be in a position to provide more details regarding Soviets connected with both the KGB and GRU. (S)

(U) Photographs of UN Secretariat Personnel Shown to Informant (S)

Photographs of the following Soviet employees of the UN Secretariat were again displayed to the informant [redacted]

(U) [redacted] or because it was felt that the informant, by looking at the photographs again, might be able to furnish new or supplemental information regarding them. Where available, more than one photograph of each individual were shown to the informant and it is believed this helped to bring forth some of the information he furnished during this interview. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S) [redacted] previously identified this individual as a member of the KGB. [redacted] previously indicated he did not know him. (S)

(U) On this occasion informant advised he does not know this individual and could furnish no information regarding him. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] indicated he did not know this individual. [redacted] indicated that [redacted] was an agent of the KGB. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Approved: _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

[redacted]

(U) "clean" and as far as he knows he has no intelligence connections. [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
b7D

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

b6
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b7D

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] indicated he did not know this individual. [redacted] has identified KOMIN as an agent of the KGB. (S)

On this occasion the informant stated that [redacted] is "clean" (U) and to the informant's knowledge has no connection with a Soviet intelligence agency. [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] stated he did not know this individual. [redacted] has identified him as a member of the KGB. (S)

(U) On this occasion, after carefully looking at photographs of [redacted] the informant identified him as a member of the Political Branch of the KGB in NY. He said that [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~
(Type in plain text or code)

Via
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
b7D

ALEKSEI I. KULAK

(U) Previously [redacted] indicated he knew of no intelligence connections regarding this Soviet. [redacted] had identified him as a KGB agent. (S)

(U) On this occasion [redacted] stated KULAK is an agent of the KGB as well as a scientist. Informant said he based this evaluation on the fact that he has observed this individual in the KGB secret space on the fourth floor at the Soviet Mission. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~ (Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] indicated he did not know this individual. [redacted] has identified him as a member of the KGB. (S)

(U) On this occasion informant said he does not know this Soviet. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] identified this individual as a member of the GRU. [redacted] had identified him as a member of the KGB. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] has stated he does not know this individual. [redacted] has identified him as a member of the KGB. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

~~SECRET~~ Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) On this occasion the informant advised he does not know this individual and could furnish no information regarding him. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] indicated he did not know this individual. [redacted] has described him as a member of the KGB. (S)

(U) On this occasion the informant advised he does not know this individual and can furnish no information regarding him. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] indicated he did not know this individual. [redacted] has identified him as a member of the KGB. (S)

(U) On this occasion the informant described [redacted] as "clean".

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~ (Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously [redacted] indicated he did not know [redacted] said he was a member of the KGB. (S)

(U) On this occasion [redacted] stated he does not know this individual, and can furnish no information regarding him. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] stated he did not know this individual. [redacted] indicated that he was a member [redacted] (S)

(U) On this occasion, after carefully looking at photographs, the informant said he did not know this individual, and can furnish no information regarding him. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] indicated he did not know this individual. [redacted] stated he was an agent of the KGB. (S)

(U) On this occasion the informant recognized a photograph of [redacted]. He stated [redacted] is not employed by the KGB, but on occasion he handles specific assignments for (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FBI

Date:

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Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Photographs of Other Soviets Shown to the Informant (S)

(U) Photographs of the following Soviets in NY were shown to the informant to determine if he could furnish new or supplemental information regarding them. Information he furnished is set out below under appropriate captions: (S)

(U) Tass [redacted] (S)

(U) Previously [redacted] indicated that [redacted] was an agent of the GRU. [redacted] indicated he did not know this individual. (S)

Approved: _____ ~~SECRET~~ _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~ (Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ (Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) On this occasion the informant advised that [redacted] is a member of the GRU. [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously [redacted] indicated he did not know this individual. [redacted] said he was a member of the KGB. (S)

(U) On this occasion the informant said he believed [redacted] is "clean". He identified him as [redacted] He said he believed this man is "clean" [redacted] (S)

(U) General Rule for Identifying Soviet Intelligence Agents (S)

(U) Informant stated that as a general rule it is possible to tell what branch of the intelligence services a man is connected with by seeing who he associates with. (S)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date:

SECRET

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) He stated that as a rule, if you see a man with a person you know to be a GRU agent, then they are both GRU agents. He said this is also true of the KGB and in like respect persons who have no intelligence connections will not normally fraternize with a member of an intelligence agency. [redacted]

[redacted]

(S)

SECRET

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 6/7/62

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT : [redacted]
IS - R

b3
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b7E

ReBuairtel, 5/31/62.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 134 copies of dissemination memoranda containing information furnished by [redacted] to SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. on 5/28/62. These memoranda are for the appropriate Bureau files.

Enclosed for WFO are three copies of the same memorandum for the appropriate WFO files.

The referenced Bureau airtel suggested that in the future NYO designate 2 copies of airtels containing information obtained from this source as the result of interviews. Therefore, no dissemination memorandum based on subsequent interviews of [redacted] will be furnished WFO and WFO is requested to disseminate to its files on the basis of information furnished in subsequent NYO airtels.

This concludes dissemination of inf[redacted] furnished by the informant on 5/28/62.

131 encls. detached & filed in individual case files

134 ENCLOSURE

(3)- [redacted] (Encls. 134)(RM)
1 - Washington Field (Encls. 3)(RM)
1 - [redacted]

[redacted]

67 JUN 8 1962

TJM:emv
(6)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 5-15-03 BY 60267 NSIBaw/mc

[redacted]

cc - Wick

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

53 JUN 19 1962

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 6/8/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b3
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b7E

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

~~5-15-03~~
~~CLASSIFIED BY 60267 AIS/BaustMC~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6~~

When interviewed on 6/4/62 by SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR., [redacted]

[redacted]

(U)

[redacted] (S)

(U)

[redacted] (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

3 - [redacted] (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Info) (RM)
1 - [redacted] (Adm.)

[redacted]

HEM:dmg
CC - Wick (7)

EX 100

13 JUN 1962

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

54 JUN 14 1962

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(U) [redacted]

[redacted]

The NYO will be alert for any information regarding

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

M E M O R A N D U M

~~SECRET~~

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b7D
b7E

TO: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] DATE: 6/6/62

FROM: SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

10/3/03 AKG
CLASSIFIED BY 60267/uc/sp/dve
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
971574

Source [redacted]
Date Contacted 5/28/62
Contacted By SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.
Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
(U) 1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 -

1 - [redacted]
1 -
1 -
(U) 1 -
1 -
SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES)
1 - [redacted] (SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES; ILLEGAL SUPPORT SECTION)
1 - [redacted] (SOVIET NATIONALS EMPLOYED AT UN)
1 - [redacted] (SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE)
1 - [redacted]

TJM:dmg
(17)

~~SECRET~~

[redacted]

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be delicate and will necessitate a classification above ~~"Confidential"~~ since a disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of ~~"Confidential"~~ will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals (U) and can be adequately paraphrased.

NYO recommends against inclusion of this information in communications suitable for dissemination.

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least ~~"Secret"~~.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- in the middle of 1962 advised...." The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

b6
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b7D

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted]

Informant stated that he could furnish no further information regarding this matter. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7D

(U) [redacted]

Informant advised that [redacted] informed him that
(U) not long ago a Soviet illegal intelligence agent, who was a Soviet citizen operated by the KGB, defected [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted] did not identify this defectee by name to the informant and the informant can furnish no additional information concerning him at this time. Informant stated that to his knowledge there had been no publicity concerning this defection.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 01-15-2015 By: J89J28T90

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

M E M O R A N D U M

~~SECRET~~

TO: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] DATE: 6/6/62

FROM: SA [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

10/3/03
CLASSIFIED BY 60322/UCBAW/tw
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
97,574

Source [redacted]
Date Contacted 5/28/62
Contacted By SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.
Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

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ejc TJM:dmg
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ENCLOSURE

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(U) 1 - New York (100-92701)
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1 - Bureau (62-77787-240)
(UN PERSONNEL - USSR)
(SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE)
(RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS)
1 - Bureau (65-67348) (SOVIET POSSESSION OF FBI COMMUNICATIONS
1 - Washington Field (66-2479)
1 - (SOVIET-BLOC ESPIONAGE AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE MATTERS)

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COPIES CONTINUED

(U) 1 - [redacted] (SOVIET ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES; ILLEGAL -- SUPPORT SECTION) (S)

1 - [redacted]

1 - [redacted]

1 - Bureau (61-5381) (AMTORG)

1 - [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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[redacted]

- When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be delicate and will necessitate a classification above "~~Confidential~~" since a disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all (U) other instances, a classification of "~~Confidential~~" will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals (S) and can be adequately paraphrased.

NYO recommends against inclusion of this information in communications suitable for dissemination.

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least "~~Secret~~".

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- in the middle of 1962 advised...." The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) USSR UN Mission Personnel Identified by Photographs (S)


(U) The informant identified from photographs the following individuals and designated them as members of the KGB intelligence service; informant's comments concerning these individuals are set forth: (S)

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
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
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
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[redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) USSR Mission to the UN - Fourth Floor (S)

(U) The informant advised that under no circumstances was an employee at the USSR Mission to the UN permitted on the fourth floor of the building unless he had some affiliation with either of the two intelligence services occupying this floor. He stated that this rule was strictly enforced probably because the mere presence of an individual on that floor would of itself indicate affiliation with one of the two services. (S)

(U) The informant indicated that if he did not observe an individual in the space allocated for the KGB on the fourth floor, but did observe him on that floor, then that individual would of necessity be a GRU agent. (S)

(U) Maintenance of KGB Appointment Book (S)

Informant advised that [redacted]

(U) [redacted] an appointment book. This book is maintained on the fourth floor and in it are noted the dates of contacts to be made, the respective names of the KGB agents who are to make contacts, and the code names of the individuals to be contacted. (S)

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[redacted]

(U) The informant stated that with respect to ordinary routine contacts by agents, the above information is listed in the appointment book [redacted] The informant further advised that in those contacts which are considered to be of great or significant importance, the time of contact is also reflected in this book. (S)

(U) On such an occasion, according to the informant, [redacted] if he felt the circumstances warranted it, could direct other intelligence people in the KGB to assist in the anticipated meet. Their function could be as observers in the area in order to detect any possible surveillance of the meet itself. Informant indicated that on such occasions agents having this duty might have with them portable radio receivers, such as described above, to assist in detecting any possible FBI radio transmissions concerning the specific meet. (S)

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-25-2014 By: J89J28T90

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

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M E M O R A N D U M

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TO: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted] DATE: 6/7/62

FROM: SA [redacted]

10/3/03
CLASSIFIED BY 60260/uls/Bunkle
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
971574

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

Source [redacted]
Date contacted 5/28/62
Contacted by SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR.

Characterized An individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

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
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TJM:dmg
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ENCLOSURE


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
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1 - New York (100-92701) 1 - Bureau (62-77787-240) (UNKNOWN PERSONNEL - USSR)
1 - (CURRENT SOVIET ESPIONAGE AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES)
1 - (SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE)
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[redacted]

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature so as to prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be delicate and will necessitate a classification above ~~"Confidential"~~ since a disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a detrimental effect upon international relations and the national defense. In all other instances, a classification of ~~"Confidential"~~ will be adequate if the information relates to Soviet nationals and can be adequately paraphrased. (U) (S)

NYO recommends against inclusion of this information in communications suitable for dissemination.

If information set forth in this memorandum is disseminated outside the Bureau, it is recommended that it be given a classification of at least ~~"Secret"~~.

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"NY T- in the middle of 1962 advised...." The information then set forth should not include those details which could conceivably disclose the informant as the source.

(U) USSR UN Mission Personnel Identified By Photographs (S)

(U) The informant identified from photographs the following individuals as members of the GRU (Military Intelligence Service) attached to the USSR Mission to the UN; informant's comments concerning these individuals set forth: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)


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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted]


(U) (S)

(U) Miscellaneous Information Concerning Additional USSR Mission Employees (S)

(U) Photographs of the following individuals, all employed by the USSR Mission to the UN, were shown to the informant, but he was unable to identify any of them as members of either the KGB or the GRU. His comments concerning each, some of whom he knows casually, are set out: (S)


(U) [redacted] (S)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted]

[redacted]

Informant did not know this individual's name and had no information concerning her.

(U) USSR Mission Employees Not Known to Informant

(U) There is set forth below a list of Soviet nationals employed at the USSR Mission to the UN. Photographs of each of these individuals were exhibited to the informant and he indicated that none of these had any connection with intelligence activities. He advised that he had no personal information concerning any of them:

(U) [redacted]

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DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-26-2014 By J89J28T90

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

SECRET

FBI

Date: 6/7/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

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ReBuairtel, 6/5/62, and NYairtel, 5/23/62, captioned as above.

Reference is made to paragraph one of reBuairtel requesting identification of the American agent whom the informant considers to be the most important operative for the KGB [redacted] as set forth in initial NYairtel in this case dated 5/23/62.

(U)

As noted in reNYairtel, [redacted]

(U) [redacted] would make available to the NYO the names of important Soviet intelligence agents handling the most valuable American agents in this country. (S)

3 - [redacted] (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Info) (RM)
1 - [redacted] (Inv.)

VJC:dmg
(7)

REC-1

18 JUN 8 1962

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NIS/Baw/mc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6 5-15-0

SECRET

Approved: [redacted] Sent [redacted] M Per [redacted]
Special Agent in Charge

54 JUN 14 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b7D

[redacted]

This information as furnished by the informant (U) was set forth on page 15 of NYairtel of 5/24/62, under the caption "Soviet Intelligence Agents Considered By Informant To Have Important Contacts With Americans". (S)

It is noted as the NYO has pointed out in other communications in this case, that the informant [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) convey that he could furnish information regarding Soviet intelligence agents whom he considered to be most important in their contacts with American agents. [redacted]

With respect to paragraph two of reBuairtel, it is noted that the NYO has opened cases on the unknown subjects mentioned by the informant, details of which have been furnished to the Bureau. In addition, the NYO is opening cases as additional information is received from the informant.

The NYO is giving constant and continuous attention to these matters and it is contemplated that the informant will be thoroughly interviewed concerning each such case described above for specific detailed information.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-26-2014
By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date: 6-8-62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

5-15-03
CLASSIFIED BY ~~60267 AIS/BawtmC-AAG~~
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

As noted in NY airtels to the Bureau in this case, [redacted] has been shown photographs of all Soviet personnel in the NY area and has made many identifications of Soviet nationals as members of the KGB or the GRU (military) intelligence organizations. This data regarding identifications of specific Soviets has been reviewed and has been compared with information furnished by [redacted] regarding affiliation of the same Soviets with the intelligence organizations. (S)

With respect to the above, the following comments are made:

In general, [redacted] are in substantial agreement on their identifications of Soviet nationals in the NY area as members of one or the other intelligence organization. In this connection, [redacted] and has completely identified GRU personnel attached to the NY residency. In addition, he has identified many members of the KGB attached to the NY residency. He has also identified those Soviet nationals who work on the fourth floor at 680 Park Avenue and who are attached to the MID (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) which, according to [redacted] also occupies fourth floor space at the USSR Mission along with GRU and KGB personnel. These MID [redacted]

(U)

(U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CC - WFO

REC-15

18 JUN 9 1962

3 [redacted] (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Info) (RM)
1 - [redacted]

JUN 14 1962

Approved: [redacted] Sent [redacted] M

Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b7D

[redacted]

(U) have no connection with either the KGB or the GRU. [redacted] has identified many Soviets as KGB agents whom [redacted] does not know as such. This is understandable in view of [redacted] and the fact that [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) In analyzing a copy of a diagram drawn by [redacted] concerning allocation of fourth floor space at the USSR Mission, it is readily apparent that the GRU and MID personnel use a common door to get to their respective organizational space. KGB agents, during the normal course of their duties and their presence on the fourth floor, who might not be aware of the presence of MID personnel on that floor, would logically assume that anyone passing through this door would necessarily be GRU personnel. This would appear to be borne out in the case of [redacted] who, as noted below, has identified from photographs seven Soviet nationals as members of the GRU because he has (S)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) observed them on the fourth floor at the USSR Mission, entering what he describes as GRU space. [redacted] has never indicated his knowledge of the presence of MID on this floor and has, in fact, specified that the entire floor is occupied solely by GRU and KGB personnel and is prohibited to others. (S)

(U) Interviewing Agents contemplate having [redacted] draw a detailed floor plan of the fourth floor space at the USSR Mission and thereon indicate the area in which he works as well as other areas he has visited. This would present an opportunity to ask [redacted] what space is occupied by MID without disclosing to him that the interviewing Agents are aware that MID personnel presently occupy space on the fourth floor in the building. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
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Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) to [redacted] Photographs of the following Soviets have been shown and he has ultimately identified them as members of the GRU on the basis of the fact that he has seen them in the corridor on the fourth floor of the Soviet Mission or has seen them entering what he describes as the GRU space on that floor, but has never seen them in the KGB space at the Soviet Mission. As pointed out in this communication, this apparently indicates to [redacted] that they are therefore necessarily members of the GRU: (S)

UN Secretariat

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] had identified this individual as a member of the GRU. [redacted] had not identified him as having any intelligence connections. (S)

(U) [redacted]

On 6/4/62, [redacted] described him as a member of the GRU on the basis of having seen him on the fourth floor at the Soviet Mission. He has not seen him in the KGB space. [redacted] said he has seen this individual only in New York

(U) [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] identified this individual as a member of the KGB. [redacted] had not identified him as having any intelligence connections. (S)

(U) [redacted]

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date:

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Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

[redacted]

On 6/4/62, [redacted] identified him as a member of the GRU [redacted]

(U) [redacted] said he has never spoken to this individual and can furnish no further information regarding him. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] identified this individual as a member of the KGB. [redacted] had not identified him as having intelligence connections. (S)

On 6/4/62, after observing several photographs of this individual, [redacted] identified this individual as a member of the GRU [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] identified this individual as a suspected KGB agent. [redacted] had identified him as a member of the GRU. (S)

On 6/4/62, on the basis of observing several photographs of this individual, [redacted] described him as a member of the GRU [redacted] (S)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] has not identified this individual has having intelligence connections.

(U) [redacted] had identified him as a member of the GRU. (S)

On this occasion, [redacted] identified him as a member of the GRU [redacted]

[redacted] was shown several photographs of [redacted] and was quite definite in his identification. [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date:

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Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Soviet Mission (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] had not identified this individual as having Soviet intelligence connections. [redacted] had identified him as an agent of the GRU. (S)

(U)

On 6/4/62, [redacted] described this individual as a member of the GRU [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] had identified this individual as an agent of the GRU. [redacted] had identified him as a member of the KGB. (S)

(U)

On this occasion, [redacted] after observing several photographs of [redacted] stated that this individual is a member of the GRU [redacted]

(U)

It would therefore appear that there is no conflict between (S)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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FBI

Date:

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Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

the identification of [redacted]

[redacted]

(U)

[redacted] (S)

(U) Photographs of the following Soviets have been shown to [redacted] resulting in identification as set out below: (S)

UN Secretariat

[redacted]

Previously, [redacted] had identified this individual as an agent of the KGB. [redacted] had not made an identification of him as a Soviet intelligence agent. (S)

(U)

On 6/4/62, after looking at several photographs of [redacted] identified him as a member of the GRU.

[redacted]

(U)

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

[redacted]

(U) Photographs of the following Soviets have been shown to [redacted] resulting in the following identification: (S)

UN Secretariat

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] had identified this individual as an agent of the KGB. [redacted] identified him as an agent of the GRU. (S)

(U)

On 6/4/62, after looking at several photographs of [redacted] stated he could not identify this individual. (S)

(U)

(U) Soviet Mission (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Previously, [redacted] identified this individual as a member of the GRU. [redacted] identified him as a member of the KGB. (S)

(U)

On 6/4/62, [redacted] after looking at several photographs of this individual, advised that he could furnish no information regarding this individual. It would appear that [redacted] had previously, on the basis of looking at photographs, confused him with someone else [redacted] (S)

(U)

Approved: _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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FBI

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Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

[redacted]

(U) It appeared to the interviewing agents that [redacted] made the above evaluations of Soviets without hesitation, and in a sincere, straightforward manner. It would also appear he made the evaluations to the best of his knowledge. The NYO will be alert for any new or different information [redacted] can furnish regarding these individuals. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-26-2014
By: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

Date: 6/8/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b6
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b7D
b3
b7E

(U) TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

(U) FROM : SAC, NEW YORK

(U)

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

(U) IDENTITY OF US SCIENTISTS, FORMER OR CURRENT CONTACTS OF KGB
ESP - R

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ReNYairtel, 6/5/62.

(U) [redacted]

Informant advised that [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

KGB is interested. The informant said he was told by [redacted] that he (the informant) [redacted]

EX 100

5 - Bureau [redacted] (RM)
(1- [redacted]
(1- [redacted]

REC- 13

(U) 1 - [redacted]
(U) 1 - [redacted]
(U) 1 - [redacted]

5-15-03

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 UC/Baw/mc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

TJM:csv
(9)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

57 JUN 18 1962

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(U) [redacted] (S)

The informant stated that [redacted]

(U) [redacted] Informant advised that he would make this information available as soon as he receives it and it is safe for him to do so. (S)

(U) On the basis of the above information, the NYO is opening a case concerning these scientists, as captioned above. This case will be a means of controlling any individual cases which will be opened as a result of the informant's furnishing detailed information concerning identities of these scientists. (S)

The NYO is cognizant of the Bureau's interest in this matter and will advise the Bureau promptly when detailed information concerning the identities of these scientists is made known by the informant.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-26-2014
BY: J89J28T90

~~SECRET~~

Date: JUN 8 1962

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT

Via AIRTEL

(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI .

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

b6
b7C
b7D

SUBJECT: (U) [UNSUB; Male Scientist At University of Illinois Formerly Operated by GRU ESP - R (S)

IS - R

5-15-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267015/Baumc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

(U) ReBuairtel to Los Angeles, San Francisco and Springfield, dated 5/29/62, captioned "UNSUB; Soviet Efforts to Obtain Computor Data, ESP-R". Inasmuch as information (S)

9 - (RM)
(T) 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 -) (UNSUB; SOVIET EFFORTS TO OBTAIN COMPUTOR DATA)
1 -) (UNSUB; SOVIET EFFORTS TO OBTAIN COMPUTOR DATA) (INFO) (RMAM)
(U) 1 -) (UNSUB; SOVIET EFFORTS TO OBTAIN COMPUTOR DATA) (INFO) (RMAM) (S)
3 - RMAM)
(UNSUB; SOVIET EFFORTS TO OBTAIN COMPUTOR DATA)
1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - 1 - (UNSUB; SOVIET EFFORTS TO OBTAIN COMPUTOR DATA)
1 -
1 -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ORIGINAL FILED IN

GAD:dmg
(22)

(S) ~~SECRET~~

NOT RECORDED
160 JUN 12 1962

Approved: Sent M Per

JUN 15 1962

~~SECRET~~

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b7E

[redacted]

(U) relating to captioned [unsub may throw some light on the unsub of referenced Buairtel, a copy of instant communication is being furnished for the information of Bureau and offices handling case captioned "UNSUB; Soviet Efforts to Obtain Computor Data".] (S)

When incorporating information furnished by [redacted] into communications suitable for dissemination outside the Bureau, Bureau authority is not necessary when the information can be paraphrased so that the identity of the informant is not jeopardized. If certain specific information is of such a nature which would prohibit dissemination, the Bureau should be advised of the basis for non-dissemination.

Certain information furnished by [redacted] will be of such a nature as to necessitate a classification above "~~Confidential~~" since disclosure of such information to unauthorized persons could have a very detrimental effect on international relations and the national defense. In all other instances a classification of ~~"Confidential"~~ (U) will be adequate if the information relates to [Soviet nationals] and can be adequately paraphrased. (S)

In setting forth information suitable for dissemination, the following terminology is suggested:

"Field Office T- in the middle of 1962 advised..."

The informant is currently characterized as an individual with whom there has been insufficient contact to determine the reliability of the information furnished.

NO INFORMATION SHOULD BE SET FORTH FOR DISSEMINATION WHICH COULD CONCEIVABLY DISCLOSE THE INFORMANT AS THE SOURCE.

(U) On 6/4/62, [redacted] advised that he received a telephone call from [redacted]

[redacted]

~~SECRET~~

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b7D

Informant stated that

(U)

(S)

(U)

(S)

(U)

(S)

(U)

(S)

(U)

(S)

The informant advised that no further particulars regarding this individual at the University of Illinois were furnished to him.

(U)

and this may have some (S)

(S)

[redacted] b3 b7E

bearing on why the informant, [redacted] was selected for this assignment.

(U) [redacted] b6 b7C b7D

Offices receiving a copy of this airtel will appreciate the fact that much of the above information is of such a type that it cannot be disseminated outside the Bureau. Only when the information can be suitably paraphrased to protect the informant should it be disseminated outside the Bureau.

(U) In view of the above information, the Springfield Office should open a case on "UNSUB; Male Scientist At University of Illinois Formerly Operated by GRU". The NYO will, in future contacts with informant, attempt to definitely identify this unsub scientist and furnish Springfield with his identity as well as any information regarding his past operation by the GRU. (S)

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-26-2014
By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

Memorandum

Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

b3
b6
b7C
b7D
b7E

TO : MR. W. C. SULLIVAN

DATE: June 5, 1962

FROM : MR. D. E. MOORE

cc Mr. Belmont
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. D. E. Moore
Mr. Branigan
[redacted]
Mr. M. F. Row

SUBJECT: [redacted]
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

[redacted]

ASAC Schmit, NYO, advised on 6-5-62 that since [redacted] New York has been attempting to work out secure arrangements for contacts with him. Schmit advised that New York can [redacted] it is felt it would be a secure meeting place.

(U) Schmit requested authority to [redacted]

ACTION:

(U) Schmit was authorized to go ahead [redacted]

DEM:td (7)

5-15-03

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 DSLBaw/mc-AM6
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

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EX-100
REC- 20

9 JUN 13 1962

68 JUN 18 1962

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[redacted]

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 11-26-2014
BY: J89J28T90

FBI

Date: 6/4/62

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Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

ReNYairtel, 5/29/62.

[redacted] was interviewed by ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT and SAS HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. and VINCENT J. CAHILL on 6/1/62 [redacted] under secure conditions.

Informant stated that [redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

3- [redacted]
1- Washington Field (INFO)
1- [redacted]

5-15-03 60267 AIG/Baumc-AAG
CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

REC-15
EX-115

VJC:JCG
(9) 275

[redacted]

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

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[redacted]

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

Informant stated that he is most careful on his way to meetings with agents and is constantly alert to everything bearing upon his security.

Informant stated that he has some plans [redacted]

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

[redacted] Informant said that [redacted] In the course of conversation informant stated that the standard of living in the US is certainly on a higher level than it is in the Soviet Union. [redacted]

[redacted]

(U) Informant stated that he is in a position to prepare a detailed organizational chart concerning the breakdown of the KGB intelligence service in Moscow. He indicated that he could do this by department personnel and function. He said that he would give this matter (S)

b7D

[redacted]

close attention and if it was at all possible within the confines of his personal security he would endeavor to have this ready in the near future, perhaps as early as June 4 next.

At this meeting a subsequent meeting with the informant was scheduled [redacted] when the informant could be available for interview.

The Bureau will be kept advised of developments in this case.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

FBI

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 05-29-2015 By: J89J28T90

Date: 6/4/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

b3
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TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

5-15-03
CLASSIFIED BY 60267/115/BaurMC-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

ReNYairtel, 5/29/62.

[redacted] was interviewed by ASAC JOSEPH L. SCHMIT and SAS HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. and VINCENT J. CAHILL in NYC under secure conditions [redacted]

In the course of the interview, informant [redacted] furnished the following information as set forth below under appropriate captions:

(U) CP Meeting At USSR Mission to UN, Evening of 5/31/62 (S)

(U) Informant stated that a CP meeting for Soviet nationals was held at the USSR Mission to the UN, 680 Park Ave., NYC, on the evening of 5/31/62. This meeting lasted from approximately 6:30 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. Speakers at the meeting included [redacted] the CP boss at the Mission of all Soviet nationals in the NY residency, Colonel [redacted] whom informant has previously identified as a KGB (S)

3 - [redacted]
2 - Washington Field (RM)
1 - [redacted] (Inv.)

REC-15 (RM)

14

12 JUN 5 1962

VJC:dmg
(10)

EX-115

51 JUN 21 1962

~~SECRET~~

Approved: [redacted] M Per [redacted]
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) agent, [redacted] whom informant previously identified as a member of the KGB and [redacted] whom informant has not identified as a member of the Soviet intelligence services. (S)

(U) Informant stated that approximately 100 to 130 people attended this meeting. The principal speaker was [redacted] who spoke for approximately one hour. (S)

(U) The general theme of the remarks made by [redacted] concerned the conduct of Soviet personnel in the NY area. [redacted] cautioned them to be most careful in speaking of their assignments and urged them to curtail loose talk. He also cautioned the Soviet nationals against speaking freely with Americans, but excluded intelligence personnel from this restriction. [redacted] stated that a number of apartments occupied by Soviet personnel in this area have been checked by the FBI. [redacted] also cautioned the Soviet women present against visiting cheap business shops to make purchases and also advised them not to indulge in the practice of "buying sprees" since same was not in keeping with the Soviet philosophy. [redacted] also directed a few remarks to the new building purchased by the Soviet Government which is located on E. 67th St. in NYC. In speaking of this building, [redacted] told the assembly that it could be expected that every room in the building would have concealed microphones which would necessitate special care in the conduct of conversation by Soviet nationals. (S)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted] also spoke, but for a relatively short time. In his remarks he deplored the practice of drinking by Soviet nationals. He said that this was strictly prohibited. [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] also spoke briefly to the assembly, and in his remarks mainly criticized the talkative Soviet personnel who indulged in the practice of speaking too freely to American citizens. He told the meeting that it was absolutely necessary that Soviet personnel be more careful and prudent in their conversation and that they be more conscious of security. He mentioned that this was necessary because the FBI is working constantly. Informant stated that an intermission period was called in the course of the meeting and during this intermission a number of KGB people gathered around [redacted] after which he was commenting to them concerning the space to be occupied in the new Soviet building by the KGB. [redacted] stated that the KGB would have 12 rooms in the new building assigned to them. He said the quarters of the KGB would be entirely renovated including new walls, ceilings, wiring, etc., as a precaution against the concealment of microphones already installed. Informant commented that he believed that the GRU (military) people would probably have the same amount of space in the new building. (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U)

[redacted]

(U)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) It is noted that informant has previously identified [redacted] as KGB agents, both assigned to the Scientific Branch. (S)

(U) Report Concerning Nylon 66 (S)

(U) [redacted]

a Dupont business letterhead. Informant also stated that the top sheet indicated that the report was related to the technology of Nylon 66. [redacted] stated that the usual procedure would involve [redacted] dictating a short personal report concerning his procurement of the Dupont material, this report would then be typed and would be stapled or attached to the information in question, the report would be read and initialed by [redacted] after which [redacted] would then photograph the material together with the typed report and forward the film of same to Moscow by diplomatic pouch. (S)

Information Concerning
This American Agent

The informant said that [redacted]

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

Report On Polypropilene Oil

(U) [redacted] a report of approximately 400 pages concerned with Polypropilene Oil. [redacted] (S)

Informant had no other details to offer concerning this and did not know its source or what agent had procured same.

(U) KGB Policy of Controlling American Agents (S)

(U) Informant stated that in the past when a KGB agent was returning on vacation to the Soviet Union he would retain his own agents and would not turn them over to other KGB men for handling in his absence. Informant stated that this policy is not in existence at the present time. Now when notification is received that a Soviet national who is a (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

[redacted]

(U) KGB agent is going home on vacation to the Soviet Union, he must turn over his agents to other KGB men for handling in his absence. As mentioned above, the agent assuming responsibility for handling the American agent generally will not contact the American agent personally but will only be in touch with him through drops. In the event the KGB agent on vacation does not return to the US, then it would be incumbent upon the KGB man presently handling the agent to arrange for a personal contact with him. Informant stated it can be assumed that a KGB man going home on vacation will automatically turn over his agents to another member of the KGB staff. [redacted] (S)

(U) KGB Appointment Book (S)

(U) Informant stated that the appointment book maintained in KGB Headquarters at the present time is a new innovation [redacted] to obtain a ledger type book and to maintain it in order to keep posted on the whereabouts and activities of KGB men assigned to the residency. Informant stated that this book is a ledger type book, is bound, and contains approximately 100 pages in all. On each page of the book are sufficient lines to make approximately 30 entries. Informant stated that about 40 pages of this book have been used since the book was initiated. This would roughly approximate 1200 entries in the book to date. As noted previously, the book lists meetings of contacts to be made by KGB men, the date of the contact and the name or (S)

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[redacted]

code name of the person to be contacted, and if the meeting is considered to be an important one and not routine, also the time of the meeting is indicated. Informant stated that also listed in this book would be such items as a weekend trip one of the KGB agents might be intending to take and [redacted] would normally be the type of entry that would appear under this classification. Informant stated that this book is maintained by [redacted] generally makes the entries when the information is furnished to him by the interested KGB agent. Occasionally, however, if [redacted] is occupied elsewhere, an individual agent will make his own entry. During working hours [redacted] this appointment book is usually kept on his desk. The informant stated that the book is available to all KGB men and indicated that there would be no suspicion whatever attached if one of the agents were to pick up the book and peruse it. At night at the close of business hours, [redacted] generally places the book in the safe with his other papers. (S)

(U) Code Names In Appointment Book (S)

(U) With relation to the above, informant stated that he was aware that [redacted] had an agent known under the code name [redacted] In addition, informant said he was also aware that [redacted] a KGB man, had an agent who was known under the code name [redacted] Informant said that these two names appeared in the appointment book. The informant also stated that generally code names are selected by the handling agent arbitrarily and generally the code name selected has no relationship to the American agent's specialty. (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) Development of American "Rocket Man" (S)

[redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

[redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U) Targets of Soviet Intelligence in the US (S)

(U) Informant stated that the following were the principal targets of Soviet intelligence in the US: (S)

(U) 1. Regarding US atomic submarines - the Soviets are interested principally in the fuel elements and the technical arrangements for the breaking of ice. Informant commented that the Soviets have atomic submarines with 7200 ton displacement. These are capable of a speed of 42 miles per hour. Informant stated that each submarine carries medium range missiles which have a maximum range of 2,000 miles. Informant stated that the USSR atomic submarine project as of two years ago had developed to the point where the Soviets had 11 such submarines already constructed and in operation. (S)

(U) 2. Rockets - the Soviets are interested primarily in the electronic equipment of US rockets, the telemetric system of guidance and solid fuel components. (S)

(U) 3. Electronic equipment in general and in particular high speed calculating machines. (S)

(U) 4. Metallurgy - informant stated the Soviets are interested in metal alloys, metal ceramics and powder metallurgy. (S)

(U) 5. Chemistry - informant stated that every phase of chemical industry is important to the Soviets because chemistry "is weak" in the Soviet Union. Informant said the Soviets particularly are interested in information concerning synthetic materials. (S)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

~~SECRET~~

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) 6. Medicine - informant said the Soviets are interested in ~~all phases~~ in the field of bacteriology. (S)

(U) Soviet Space Program (S)

Informant stated that [redacted] BLAGONRAVOV and one PARIN whom the informant described as Academicians who were in the US and who were accompanying TITOV, the Soviet cosmonaut, on his visit to this country. Informant stated that BLAGONRAVOV is the head of the Soviet space program. (This individual appears to be identical with ANATOLI A. BLAGONRAVOV, Academician, member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences who was in the US from 4/26 until 5/11/62, to attend a meeting of the UN Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space). PARIN, referred to above, is probably identical with VASILI V. PARIN, Physiologist, who arrived in the US on 4/29/62, as a member of a group of Soviets to the International Symposium on Utilization of Artificial Satellites for Geodesic Purposes. (S)

(U) [redacted] the Soviet Union would not launch another ship into outer space until the US repeats TITOV's 17 orbit mission around the globe. At that time, according to BLAGONRAVOV, the Soviet Union will launch their three man vehicle into space for a trip around the moon and a return to earth. BLAGONRAVOV said that this space ship is now under construction and is practically completed. According to the informant, BLAGONRAVOV said that the Soviet Union has the capability at the present time to undertake and to complete the mission described above. BLAGONRAVOV indicated that the timing of this Soviet space shot would coincide with their best estimate of getting the most publicity from a propaganda standpoint by indicating to the world that the Soviets were much farther advanced in their space effort than the US. The informant commented that Soviet superiority (S)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

b7D

(U) in this field is based on the fact that the Soviets have better and more powerful boosters. (S)

(U) Informant stated that TITOV appeared at a reception at the USSR Mission to the UN during his visit to NY and also appeared at another reception given in his honor at the Czech Mission. Informant stated that TITOV had mentioned that for a limited period of time he had been ill while in orbit, but that medical doctors of the Soviet Union had attributed this illness to a deficiency in TITOV's constitution. Informant said that to his knowledge, there were no military implications in the Soviet space program. Informant also commented that this race into space on the part of the Soviets appears to him to constitute a tremendous waste of money, but said that from a propaganda viewpoint the Soviet Union considers its space effort to be of great importance and is ready to pay the price to win this race. Informant stated that in substance the moon shot will be timed to exploit the Soviet advance over American development in space exploration. (S)

[redacted]

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b7D

(U) Photographs of Personnel Employed At Amtorg Trading Corporation (S)


(U) KGB (S)

(U) Informant identified from photographs the following individuals as members of the KGB Intelligence Service: (S)


(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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b7D



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b7D

[redacted]

(U) GRU (S)

The informant identified the following individual
(U) from photographs of members of the GRU (Military Intelligence Service). He is an employee of the Amtorg Trading Corporation: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

He is in the GRU, however, informant did not know his name and identified him from photograph only.

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Miscellaneous Information Concerning Other Amtorg Trading Corporation Employees (S)

The following individual was known to the
(U) informant by name as well as photograph: (S)


(U) [redacted] (S)

The informant knew the name of this individual. He stated that he knew of no intelligence connection of this individual.

(U) [redacted] (S)

The informant was shown photographs of the following
(U) employees of Amtorg Trading Corporation. He stated he could not identify their photographs, did not know their names and could furnish no information regarding intelligence activity concerning them: (S)

b6
b7C
b7D



(U)

(~~S~~)

[redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D

(U) Photographs of Personnel Employed At the Ukrainian Mission Shown to Informant (S)

(U) KGB (S)

(U) The informant identified from photographs the following individuals as members of the KGB Intelligence Service: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted] GRU (S)

The informant observed a photograph of the
(U) following individual and identified him as a Ukrainian Mission employee who is a GRU agent: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

~~SECRET~~

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(U) The following are employees at the Ukrainian Mission in NY regarding whom the informant could furnish very limited information and no connection with Soviet Intelligence: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Changes pursuant to my letter 8/5/76 of JJO/cgd

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) The informant could furnish no information regarding the following employees of the Ukrainian Mission nor could he identify them by name or photograph: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Photographs of Personnel Employed at Byelorussian Mission Shown to Informant (S)

(U) The informant was shown photographs of the following employees of the Byelorussian Mission at NY. He could furnish no information regarding Soviet Intelligence connections on the part of any of them. What information he could furnish is set out opposite their names: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

No information

No information

No information

No information

No information

No information

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) The informant was shown photographs of the following individuals employed at TASS and furnished information regarding them as set out below: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

No information

No information

No information

No information

(U) [redacted] (S)

No information

No information

No information

No information

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Photographs of other Soviet correspondents in NY were shown to the informant and he furnished the following information regarding them: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
b7D

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U)

[redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

No information

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

No information

(U) [redacted] (S)

Miscellaneous

(U) Informant was shown photographs of the following Soviet Nationals. The information he furnished regarding them is set out below: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

b6
b7C
b7D

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted] Additional details concerning the interview of [redacted] on 6/1/62, will be furnished to Bureau in a subsequent airtel.

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~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

EXEMPTED FROM AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION
AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
EXEMPTION CODE: 50X(1)
DATE 11-28-2014
By: J89J28T90

FBI

Date: 5/29/62

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Via AIRTEL 5-19-03
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

~~CLASSIFIED BY 60267 NKS/Baw/mc-DAG~~
~~DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [redacted]

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK [redacted]

SUBJECT: [redacted]
IS - R

ReNYairtels to the Bureau, 5/24 and 5/25/62.

(U) [redacted] was interviewed by SAS VINCENT J. CAHILL and HARRY E. MORRIS, JR. [redacted] under secure conditions. Informant stated that [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

3 - [redacted]
1 - [redacted]

REC- 9
(RM)
(Inv.)

HEM:dmg
(8)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M P
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

b3
b7D
b7E
b6
b7C
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b3
b7D
b7E

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SECRET

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

[redacted] b7D

[redacted]

(U) Visit to Soviet Mission to UN on 5/26/62 (S)

(U) Information Concerning [redacted] (S) b6 b7C b7D

(U) [redacted] at the Soviet Mission, 680 Park Ave., [redacted] six large cases bearing the following caption: (S)

(U) Emulsion Car 4D2
Kodalith
22-285-20275
Detail 10F3 (S)

Informant stated these cases measured approximately 65 centimeters by 15 centimeters by 45 centimeters. He

(U) stated [redacted] these cases contained an "emulsion of high (S)

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Special Agent in Charge

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Date:

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(Priority or Method of Mailing)

b6
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b7D

(U) activity from Kodalith Co."(S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Conversation With [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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Special Agent in Charge

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(U) "We have a man among UN security service personnel" and that from him the Soviet intelligence knows of the UN security force activity. (S)

told the informant that a man whom he did not describe and informant could not further identify, had a talk with ROBERT KENNEDY, Attorney General of the US. KENNEDY told this man that the FBI has knowledge of Soviet intelligence activity at the UN and that the FBI can at any time repeat the IGOR MELEKH pick-up. Informant said he could furnish no further information regarding this matter. (S)

(U) Soviet Defectee in Finland (S)

Informant said stated that not long ago a Soviet illegal intelligence agent who was a Soviet citizen operated by the KGB defected in Finland and asked the protection of the Finnish Government.

did not identify this defectee by name to the informant and the informant can furnish no additional information at this time. The informant stated that to his knowledge, there had been no publicity concerning this defectee. (S)

(U) Photographs of Personnel Employed At USSR UN Mission Shown to Informant (S)

(U) KGB (S)

(U) Informant identified from photographs the following individuals as members of the KGB intelligence service: (S)

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FBI

Date:

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(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
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(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

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Special Agent in Charge

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
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Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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FBI

Date:

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(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

pcc page 24

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FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U)

(S)

(U)

(S)

(U)

(S)

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FBI

Date:

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Transmit the following in _____
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Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

(U)

(U)

(U)

(U)

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Date:

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Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U)

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(U)

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Date:

Transmit the following in _____
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Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U)

(U) (S)

(U) (S)

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(U) (S)

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Date:

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Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

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SECRET

FBI

Date:

Transmit the following in _____
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Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) GRU (S)

(U) The informant identified the following individuals from photographs as members of the GRU (Military Intelligence Service) attached to the USSR Mission to the UN: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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Date:

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(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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Date:

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[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

The informant advised that under no circumstances was an employee at the USSR Mission to the UN allowed on the fourth floor of the building unless he had some affiliation with one of the two intelligence services. He stated that this rule was strictly enforced. He also pointed out that the mere presence of an individual on that floor would indicate affiliation with one of the two services and it was his observation that if he did not observe an individual in the KGB space on the fourth floor, then that individual would of necessity be a GRU agent. (S)

(U) Maintenance of KGB Appointment Book (S)

(U) [redacted] maintains an appointment book [redacted] on the fourth floor (S)

Approved: _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

[redacted]

in

(U) The informant stated that/this book are maintained dates of contacts to be made, the respective names of the KGB agents who are to make contacts and the code names of the individuals who are to be contacted. The informant stated that with respect to the ordinary routine contacts by agents, the above information is listed in the appointment book. [redacted] The informant further stated that in contacts which are to be made and which are considered to be of great or significant importance, the time of the contact is also indicated in the appointment book. On such an occasion, according to the informant, [redacted] if he felt the circumstances warrant it, would direct other intelligence people in the KGB to assist in the meet to be made. Their function might be as observers in the area in order to detect any possible surveillance on the meet itself. He also indicated that on such occasions, agents assigned to this duty might have with them portable radio receivers such as described above in order to detect any possible radio transmissions of the FBI covering a specific meet. (S)

(U) Miscellaneous Information Concerning Other USSR Mission Employees (S)

(U) Photographs of the following individuals, all employees of the USSR Mission to the UN, were shown to the informant, but he was unable to identify any of them as members of the KGB or the GRU. It is noted that he knew some of these individuals casually and his comments concerning each are set forth below: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] (S)

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Special Agent in Charge

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(U) (S)

(U) (S)

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Special Agent in Charge

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
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Date:

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(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

(U) Employee. Informant did not know this individual's name and had no information concerning her. (S)

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

b6
b7C
b7D

(U) USSR Mission Employees Not Known to Informant (S)

(U) Set forth below is a list of Soviet nationals employed at the USSR Mission to the UN. Photographs of each of these individuals was shown to the informant on 5/28/62. He indicated that none of these individuals had any connection with intelligence activities and further stated that he had no personal information concerning any of them: (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

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FBI

Date:

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(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U)

(S)

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Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____

Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

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
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Date:

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(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____ _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U) (S)

The Bureau will be kept advised of all pertinent developments in this case.

~~SECRET~~

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

~~SECRET~~

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~~SECRET~~

F B I

Date:

Transmit the following in ~~SECRET~~ _____
(Type in plain text or code)

Via _____
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

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(U) [redacted]

(S) [redacted]

(U) [redacted]

Approved: _____ Sent _____ M Per _____
Special Agent in Charge

DECLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY DERIVED FROM:
FBI AUTOMATIC DECLASSIFICATION GUIDE
DATE 02-13-2015 By: J89J28T90

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : W. C. Sullivan SECRET DATE: 6-8-62

FROM : W. A. Branigan 5-19-03

CLASSIFIED BY 60267 AIS/Baw/mc-AAG
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

SUBJECT: [redacted] INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA #971574

1 - Belmont
1 - Sullivan
1 - DE Moore
1 - Branigan
1 - Gheesling
1 - Linton
1 - Litrento 1 - [redacted]

[redacted]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

(U) UNKNOWN MALE SCIENTIST AT UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS FORMERLY OPERATED BY GRU: (S)

[redacted]

(U) [redacted] the University of Illin to locate and contact a male scientist whom the GRU had previously operated but had "lost" sometime in the past. [redacted] carry out this assignment. (S)

(U) PROFESSOR EUGENE RABINOWITZ, UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS: (S)

(U) Source also recalled a situation involving Rabinowitz, a scientist and teacher at the University of Illinois who is 66 to 70 years of age. Source said that while in the USSR for about 3 weeks attending a biological congress in Moscow, Rabinowitz became of interest to the KGB which learned he had several mistresses in Moscow. The KGB put microphones in the apartment of one of his mistresses, a [redacted] Their intimate conversations were recorded and compromising photographs where also obtained. The KGB was interested in Rabinowitz because of his friendship with 2 top Soviet scientists and because Rabinowitz has a number of friends among scientists at the Argonne National Laboratory in this country. The KGB desired to develop Rabinowitz as a source but believed he would not be cooperative and as far as source knows, when Rabinowitz left Moscow in November, 1961, the KGB had not contacted Rabinowitz or his mistress. (S)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

JJT:cgw
(9)

JUN 18 1962

JUN 13 1962

FX-115

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b7E

~~SECRET~~

Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan
Re: [redacted]

b6
b7C
b7D
b3
b7E

(U) **COLONEL RUDOLF IVANOVICH ABEL:** (S)

(U) Previous memo DE Moore to WC Sullivan 5-24-62 advised of information previously furnished by source concerning Abel's having had 3 other illegal agents working with him in the U.S. [redacted] (S)

(U) [redacted] (S)

ACTION:

(U) For your information. [Appropriate investigation is being initiated to identify the unknown male scientist at the University of Illinois, and the illegal agent in the Abel case] and to develop additional information concerning these situations outlined above after which consideration will be given to dissemination where appropriate. (S)

~~SECRET~~